War and the Fate of Regimes: A Comparative Analysis

Mesquita, Bruce Bueno de; Siverson, Randolph M.; Woller, Gary M.

doi:10.2307/1964127

Cited by 204 publications

(82 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Indeed, studies of American public opinion have shown consistently that the popularity of wars and wartime presidents tend to decline as a function of battle deaths (e.g., Gartner 2008;Gartner and Segura 1998;Larson 1996;Mueller 1973; but see Reifler 2005/2006). Other studies have found that democratic leaders who embroil their countries in costly or losing wars are more likely to be removed from office (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995;Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992;Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003; but also see Goermans and Chiozza 2004). The check provided by democratic institutions, therefore, ensures that most democratic leaders will be highly sensitive to the costs of war.…”

Section: Democracy and Sensitivity To War Costsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bear Any Burden? How Democracies Minimize the Costs of War

Valentino¹,

Huth²,

Croco³

2010

The Journal of Politics

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In this paper, we argue that the greater accountability of democratic leaders to their citizens creates powerful pressures on leaders to reduce the human costs of war. In an analysis of a new dataset of fatalities in interstate wars (1900 to 2005) we find that highly democratic states suffer significantly fewer military and civilian fatalities. We argue that democracies limit their war losses primarily by adopting four specific foreign and military policies. First, democracies generate higher military capabilities than nondemocracies in times of war. Second, democracies are more likely to augment their national capabilities by joining more powerful coalitions of states during war. Third, democracies are more likely than other states to utilize battlefield military strategies that minimize their fatalities. Finally, democracies are more likely to fight wars on battlefields that are not contiguous to their home territories, thereby shielding their civilian populations from the fighting.A rough consensus has emerged in the literature on the ''democratic peace'' that, contrary to the expectations of early theorists like Immanuel Kant, democracies are not generally more pacific than nondemocracies. As modern scholars have recognized, the fact that elected leaders are more accountable to the citizens who must bear the costs of wars does not imply that these leaders will avoid wars in general-only that they will oppose highly unpopular wars that threaten their tenure in office.Recognizing this, recent studies of democratic war involvement have focused on war outcomes (defined in terms of victory and defeat) as a central concern of democratic leaders in times of war. We argue, however, that democracies should be highly attentive to the costs of war as well as its outcome; they do not seek victory at any price. Moreover, because victory is sometimes won only through a heavy price in blood and treasure, a war's outcome is not a reliable proxy for its costs. Thus, more than two centuries after it was articulated, one of the key implications of Kant's theory-that democracies should strive to minimize the costs borne by their citizens-has not been adequately tested.With this in mind, in this article we develop a refined theory of democratic war behavior and utilize a newly constructed dataset on war fatalities to conduct the most rigorous test of this theory to date. We find that highly democratic states suffer fewer military and civilian casualties in their wars than do other states. More importantly, however, we also shed new light on precisely how democracies reduce the costs of the wars they fight, a critical theoretical question largely ignored by the existing literature on the democratic peace. We argue that democracies limit their losses by adopting four key foreign and military policies that help them minimize both military and civilian fatalities-mobilizing superior military forces in times of war, utilizing casualty-reducing military strategies on the battlefield, fighting battles on distant territories and fightin...

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Section: Democracy and Sensitivity To War Costsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bear Any Burden? How Democracies Minimize the Costs of War

Valentino¹,

Huth²,

Croco³

2010

The Journal of Politics

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“…Following the findings of Belkin and Schofer (2003) and Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller (1992) that countries experiencing recent coups are more likely to experience more coups, we assume that leaders of coup-experienced countries are more concerned about the possible eruption of subsequent coups than other countries. Thus, the effect of coups or coup attempts on military resource allocation is more significant than other factors such as regime types, rivalries, or economic development.…”

Section: Downloaded By [The Agamentioning

confidence: 99%

The Post-Coup Military Spending Question Revisited, 1960–2000

Kim

Lee

2013

International Interactions

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“…Fearon (1994aFearon ( , 1994bFearon ( , 1995 developed the idea of audience costs, and Gaubatz (1999) offered a persuasive analysis on electoral incentives and democracies' wars. Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller (1992) and Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995) showed that democratic leaders' political tenure is likely to be shortened if they suffer defeat in war.…”

Section: Morrow (2002)mentioning

confidence: 99%

The democratic peace proposition: An agenda for critical analysis

Chan¹

2009

EPSJ

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The proposition that democracies are more peaceful than autocracies has spawned a huge literature. Much of the relevant quantitative research has shown that democracies indeed rarely, if ever, fight each other, although they are not necessarily less bellicose than autocracies in general. This essay seeks to identify several areas of concern that offer fruitful directions for further research to extend and clarify this proposition. These concerns relate to (1) conceptual clarification, (2) methodological assumptions, (3) causal interpretations, and (4) policy relevance.

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War and the Fate of Regimes: A Comparative Analysis

Cited by 204 publications

References 8 publications

Bear Any Burden? How Democracies Minimize the Costs of War

Bear Any Burden? How Democracies Minimize the Costs of War

The Post-Coup Military Spending Question Revisited, 1960–2000

The democratic peace proposition: An agenda for critical analysis

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