War and Economy in the Third Reich

Overy, Richard

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198202905.001.0001

Cited by 154 publications

(73 citation statements)

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“…In the crucial years before, their role is much less important. In 1933 and 1934, combined expenditure on roads and the autobahn amounted to 972.8 million RM, which is half the size of the estimate made by Overy (1975Overy ( , 1994 14 . Autobahn construction, in particular, is entirely insignificant in 1934 and gains momentum only in 1936, when the German economy already approached full employment.…”

Section: Public Investment Work Creation and The Autobahnmentioning

confidence: 86%

“…Up to 1936, much of this activity took place in work-creation and autobahn construction. Overy (1975Overy ( , 1982Overy ( , 1994 affirmed that these projects indeed had their significance in gearing the German economy to higher output and employment in the 1930s. Others, like Mason (1977), Silverman (1988), and Hachtmann (1989), pointed to inconsistencies in German labor market statistics to argue that Nazi work creation programs were more of a statistical artifact than a reality.…”

Section: Public Investment Work Creation and The Autobahnmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…In the fiscal years from 1933-4 to 1935-6, military spending totaled some 11.2 billion RM, as opposed to the 8-9 billion RM assumed by Overy (1994). From 1933 to 1934, the expansion of the public budget also led to an increase in non-military spending.…”

Section: Public Investment Work Creation and The Autobahnmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Deficit Spending in the Nazi Recovery, 1933–1938: A Critical Reassessment

Ritschl

2002

Journal of the Japanese and International Economies

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This paper examines the effects of deficits spending and work-creation on the Nazi recovery. Although deficits were substantial and full employment was reached within four years, archival data on public deficits suggest that their fiscal impulse was too small to account for the speed of recovery. VAR forecasts of output using fiscal and monetary policy instruments also suggest only a minor role for active policy during the recovery. Nazi policies deliberately crowded out private demand to ensure high rates of rearmament. Military spending dominated civilian work-creation already in 1934. Investment in autobahn construction was minimal during the recovery and gained momentum only in 1936 when full employment was approaching. Continued fiscal and monetary expansion after that date may have prevented the economy from sliding back into recession. We find some effects of the Four Years Plan of late 1936, which boosted government spending further and tightened public control over the economy.

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Section: Public Investment Work Creation and The Autobahnmentioning

confidence: 86%

Section: Public Investment Work Creation and The Autobahnmentioning

confidence: 93%

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Deficit Spending in the Nazi Recovery, 1933–1938: A Critical Reassessment

Ritschl

2002

Journal of the Japanese and International Economies

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“…Total investments during the September-December 1939 period were 1 318 million RM (Reichsmarks), increasing in 1940 to 5 841.6 million, and 7 599.6 million in 1941. 10 These massive investments explain the increase in armaments production during subsequent years. Overy provides a different picture from Mierzejewski (1988) on productivity.…”

Section: A Studies In English or English Translationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Re-assessment of the German armaments production during World War II

Salavrakos¹

2017

SCIM

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The German armaments production during World War II (1939II ( -1945) is a highly debatable issue. Many studies point out that it was a success story since the overall production increased in spite of the heavy Allied air bombing campaign during the period 1943-1945. Others point out that the size of the production could not balance the aggregate production of Britain, USA, and the USSR. This study points out that by the end of 1941 with the entry of the USSR and the US in the war Germany had to plan for two different types of war. One was a land war against the USSR and the second was a naval-air war against the Anglo-Saxon Powers (Britain and the USA). German industry did quite well with the first challenge (with the assistance of captured material and industrial power of occupied Europe) but failed in the naval-air war against the Anglo-Saxon Powers.

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“…En su calidad de responsable del Amt IIIInland, Ohlendorf conocía los temores planteados por quienes, el frente de pequeñas empresas, asistían a un proceso que podía llevar a una posguerra que supusiera también la liquidación del mundo del Mittelstand (48). Pero los esfuerzos para (47) tOOze (2006): 552-557;Overy (1994). (48) En uno de los informes se indicaba que, cuando los pequeños empresarios se preguntaban acerca del carácter de la economía tras la guerra, señalaban su temor a una «concentración de fuerzas propia del capitalismo de Estado, que ponía en duda su supervivencia.» (Informe n.º 373, del 5 de abril de 1943de , en BOBerach (ed.)…”

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Otto Ohlendorf en perspectiva. Radicalismo ideológico, ingeniería social y violencia de masas en el fascismo alemán

Gallego¹

2016

Hist. Polít. Ideas, Procesos Mov. Soc.

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War and Economy in the Third Reich

Cited by 154 publications

References 0 publications

Deficit Spending in the Nazi Recovery, 1933–1938: A Critical Reassessment

Deficit Spending in the Nazi Recovery, 1933–1938: A Critical Reassessment

A Re-assessment of the German armaments production during World War II

Otto Ohlendorf en perspectiva. Radicalismo ideológico, ingeniería social y violencia de masas en el fascismo alemán

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