War-Algorithm Accountability

Abstract

In War-Algorithm Accountability (August 2016), we introduce a new concept—war algorithms—that elevates algorithmically-derived “choices” and “decisions” to a, and perhaps the, central concern regarding technical autonomy in war. We thereby aim to shed light on and recast the discussion regarding “autonomous weapon systems” (AWS). We define “war algorithm” as any algorithm that is expressed in computer code, that is effectuated through a constructed system, and that is capable of operating in relation to armed conflict. In introducing this concept, our foundational technological concern is the capability of a constructed system, without further human intervention, to help make and effectuate a “decision” or “choice” of a war algorithm. Distilled, the two core ingredients are an algorithm expressed in computer code and a suitably capable constructed system. Through that lens, we link international law and related accountability architectures to relevant technologies. We sketch a three-part (non-exhaustive) approach that highlights traditional and unconventional accountability avenues. We focus largely on international law because it is the only normative regime that purports—in key respects but with important caveats—to be both universal and uniform. In this way, international law is different from the myriad domestic legal systems, administrative rules, or industry codes that govern the development and use of technology in all other spheres. By not limiting our inquiry only to weapon systems, we take an expansive view, showing how the broad concept of war algorithms might be susceptible to regulation—and how those algorithms might already fit within the existing regulatory system established by international law.

Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors: Reconceptualising the Legality of the ‘Unwilling or Unable’ Test in Light of the Doctrine of Necessity in International Law.

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Proscription and Group Membership in Counter-terrorism and Armed Conflict: Areas of Tensions between Criminal Law and International Humanitarian Law

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