Walter of Burley: His Life and Works

A Companion to Walter Burley

“…and so formal supposition is divided into personal supposition and simple supposition. 65 negatively, formal supposition can be understood as nonmaterial supposition, that is, when a term does not supposit for itself in one of the five senses described above (see section 2.3.4), it is taken in formal supposition. this initial approach is confirmed by the fact that formal supposition includes the two other main types of supposition besides the material one: personal supposition and simple supposition.…”

“…Burley also employs similar arguments in the Tractatus de universalibus. 65 In addition to what he previously mentioned, he also specifies that:…”

“…I shall focus on the first two only, since the questions they raise are more general. 63 In the first lines of the eighth chapter of the Categories, 65 Aristotle observes that quality is among those things that are spoken of in a number of ways-an affirmation which seems to imply that quality is not a summum genus, as, according to Aristotle himself, what is spoken of in a number of ways always gathers in several different natures. furthermore, the Stagirite speaks of four species of quality, without explaining how they are related to one another and to the highest genus of the category.…”

“…on the contrary, he takes it for granted that it has a unique primary form, common to all the items and species belonging to the category, and therefore that quality is a unitary genus.69 yet in order to explain how the four kinds of qualities stem from the supreme genus of the category, in the middle commentary on the Categories, somehow 65 following Averroes70 and Kilwardby as well,71 he inserts some intermediates between the highest genus and some of the four species, claiming that quality is first of all divided into quality which concerns change (quali ficat substantiam in quantum substantia est mobilis), and quality which does not concern change and affects substances without involving change (qualificat substantiam in quantum est abstracta a motu). Qualities which do concern change are affective qualities and affections.…”

“…"79 See Burley, Tractatus super librum Predicamentorum, cap. de relatione, 63,[22][23][24][25][26]and 65,[20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31]: "Ideo dicendum quod relatio non est eadem res cum suo fundamento; sed relatio est quidam respectus fundatus in re absoluta, ita quod relationes non sunt nisi respectus in absolutis. Intelligendum est tamen quod relationes innotescunt nobis per sua fundamenta, quia illa que habent multum excellens esse et illa que multum deficiunt ab esse subterfugiunt cognitionem nostram.…”