Waiting for the North to Rise: Revisiting Barber and Rifkin after a Generation of Union Financial Activism in the U.S.

Marens, Richard

doi:10.1023/b:busi.0000033111.06997.dc

Cited by 39 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…For example, Campbell, Gillan, and Niden (1999) reported that there were 90 proxy contests that addressed non-financially-oriented "social" issues, and 286 proxy contests that addressed financial issues in the 1997 proxy season in the USA. These broader "stakeholder" impacts surrounding shareholder activism have been of particular interest to environmental groups (Monks, Miller, & Cook, 2004;O'Rourke, 2003), employee unions (Marens, 2004), and European observers (Croci, 2007). Thus, recent research suggests that both the financial and moral legitimacy of corporations are now being challenged by shareholder activists (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007).…”

Section: Theory and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Antecedents of Shareholder Activism in Target Firms: Evidence from a Multi‐Country Study

Judge

Gaur

Muller‐Kahle

2010

Corporate Governance

128

122

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Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: This study seeks to better understand the antecedents of shareholder activism targeted at firms located in three common law countries (i.e., USA, UK, and Australia) and three civil law countries (Japan, Germany, and South Korea) during the 2003-07 time period. Research Findings/Insights: Our findings suggest that the antecedents of shareholder activism vary by the motivation of the activist. We demonstrate that activists target firms with two motives (a) to improve the financial performance, and (b) to improve the social performance of the firm. With respect to the target firm level antecedents, we find that firm size is unrelated to financial activism, but positively related to social activism; ownership concentration is negatively related to both financial and social activism; and prior profitability is negatively related to financial activism, but positively related to social activism. Further, these relationships in the case of financial activism are generally stronger in common law legal systems, whereas those in the case of social activism are generally stronger in environments with a greater level of income inequality. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our findings suggest that future research should differentiate between the motivations of the activism event. Further, we find that while agency logic works well for financial activism, institutional theory provides stronger explanations for social activism. Overall, we demonstrate the complementary nature of these two theories in explaining shareholder activism. Practitioner/Policy Implications: We found that the "exposure" to shareholder activism varies by the motivation of the activist, and the nature of the firm and its national context. An understanding of these issues would help firms develop proper response strategies to activism events.

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Section: Theory and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Antecedents of Shareholder Activism in Target Firms: Evidence from a Multi‐Country Study

Judge

Gaur

Muller‐Kahle

2010

Corporate Governance

128

122

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Threatening with divestment -the sale of shares by dissatisfied shareholders -is also viewed as an engagement tool (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009). The number of actors involved in SSE has increased in recent years and covers a broad range: pension funds (Clark and Hebb, 2004), NGOs (Guay et al, 2004;Waygood and Wehrmeyer, 2003), ROs (Proffitt andSpicer, 2006) andunions (Anderson et al, 2007;Marens, 2004).…”

Section: Features Influencing Social Shareholder Engagementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Religious organisations as investors: a Christian perspective on shareholder engagement

Cranenburgh

Arenas²,

Goodman³

et al. 2014

Society and Business Review

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International audienceThe purpose of this paper is to deepen the discussion about religious organisations’ (ROs) potential to practise their faith by means of their investments, rather than keeping both issues separate.The authors adopted a qualitative exploratory approach using seven cases of social shareholder engagement (SSE) by Christian organisations. It focused on creating knowledge from best practices.Within the three Christian organisations studied, the authors identified three significant features that relate to their religious nature and affect their SSE: having a structured belief system, a grassroots network and a long-term perspective. These features can be instrumental in impacting company behaviour and society at large.The authors chose three ROs for their relevance and comparative features, but this limited sample size makes it hard to generalise the research findings.This paper invites ROs to review their potential for actively owning their shares to be consistent with their faith and create change in business and society at large. Besides, ROs, with their unwavering belief system, extensive grassroots networks and long-term approach, are a force in the shareholder engagement field to be reckoned with by business. The paper presents multi cases of ROs active in using their investments to create change in companies and society at large

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“…Some researchers (e.g., [13]) have observed that institutional owners pay more attention to managerial decisions in the firm because the decisions and consequent company performance are critical to their financial holdings. Consequently when those institutional owners act in ways likely to be beneficial to shareholders, markets react positively [14][15][16].…”

Section: Agency Theory In Organizationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shareholder Wealth Effects of CEO Succession

Banning

2013

AJIBM

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Companies often dismiss their chief executive officers (CEOs) when financial performance falters. This study examines why, despite the positive stock market effects, the replacement of the CEO often does little to change a company's financial performance. Thanks to the agency arrangements in some companies, new CEOs are able to negotiate favorable contracts which benefit the CEO rather than the shareholders. In a sample of 140 publicly-traded firms, we found that compensation systems for new CEOs differed as a function of institutional ownership, with total executive compensation higher and compensation risk lower in firms with lower levels of institutional ownership. Financial performance was also weaker in firms with less institutional ownership.

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Waiting for the North to Rise: Revisiting Barber and Rifkin after a Generation of Union Financial Activism in the U.S.

Cited by 39 publications

References 19 publications

Antecedents of Shareholder Activism in Target Firms: Evidence from a Multi‐Country Study

Antecedents of Shareholder Activism in Target Firms: Evidence from a Multi‐Country Study

Religious organisations as investors: a Christian perspective on shareholder engagement

Shareholder Wealth Effects of CEO Succession

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