Vox

Rama, José; Zanotti, Lisa; Turnbull‐Dugarte, Stuart J.; Santana, Andrés

doi:10.4324/9781003049227

Cited by 140 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…Second, with regard to Podemos and Vox, we expect that their voters will be more likely to place themselves further from the center of the ideological scale and to be male in comparison to the voters of PSOE and PP, respectively (Ramiro and Gomez, 2017;Rooduijn, 2018;Stockemer et al, 2018;Rama et al, 2021). Third, considering only the differences between voters of Podemos and PSOE, we anticipate Podemos' voters to be better educated and more likely to express economic grievances (Orriols and Cordero, 2016;Bosch and Durán, 2019).…”

Section: Profiling the New Parties' Votersmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…In short, while the Great Recession and the great political discontent it generated are behind the emergence of Podemos (Cordero and Simón, 2015;Bosch and Durán, 2019), it is the corruption scandals of the traditional right (PP) since 2012 and the secession process in Catalonia since 2017 that help to explain the rise of Ciudadanos (Cordero and Montero, 2015;Orriols and Cordero, 2016). For the case of Vox, the Catalan issue and the federalist tensions inherent to the Spanish decentralized system and the concerns over immigration are the main drivers to understand its success (Turnbull Dugarte et al, 2020;Rama et al, 2021).…”

Section: Contextual (Social and Economic) Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Three Is a Crowd? Podemos, Ciudadanos, and Vox: The End of Bipartisanship in Spain

2021

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The traditional Spanish imperfect bipartisanship and the alternation in power that emerged in the early 80s between the center-left PSOE and the conservative PP have shifted towards a multiparty system after the emergence of three new parties. At first, as a result of the economic and political representation crises, Podemos (We Can) emerged at the 2014 European Parliament elections. This left-wing populist party managed to grow rapidly among the dissatisfied voters, reaching the third electoral position in the 2015 general elections. In the same contest, the liberal center party Ciudadanos (Citizens) became the fourth political force boosted, among other reasons, by notorious corruption scandals involving high-rank PP’s officials and the process of secession in Catalonia. Finally, driven by the same secession process and thanks to the removal from the office of PP’s Prime Minister after a motion of no confidence, the support for the populist radical right Vox also experienced a boost, winning 15 percent of the seats in Parliament in the general elections of November 2019. In this research, we describe the contexts which facilitated the irruptions of these new parties, analyze their impact on the Spanish party system, and study their current voters’ profiles.

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Section: Profiling the New Parties' Votersmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Contextual (Social and Economic) Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Three Is a Crowd? Podemos, Ciudadanos, and Vox: The End of Bipartisanship in Spain

2021

Self Cite

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“…A similar pattern exists in France, where the once hegemonic mainstream parties have become increasingly irrelevant, and elections feature a cleavage between the technocratic style of incumbent President Emmanuel Macron's En Marche party and two distinct populist alternatives: the radical right, culturally conservative populist National Rally Party and the left-leaning, culturally liberal, populist party France Unbowed. Even in countries where mainstream parties retain a large following, such as Germany, populist parties and movements have achieved electoral gains on both the left and the right (Arzheimer, 2015;Arzheimer and Berning, 2019;Rama et al, 2021;Torcal and Comellas, 2022). The onset of the Covid-19 pandemic has provoked "conflict extension" (Layman and Carsey, 2002) in many publics that relate to populist viewpoints, with populist parties opposing government mask and vaccine mandates, in line with populists' skepticism about public health experts' recommendations.…”

Section: Linking Populism and A Ective Polarizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Populism and the affective partisan space in nine European publics: Evidence from a cross-national survey

et al. 2022

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While scholars increasingly link affective polarization to the rise of populist parties, existing empirical studies are limited to the effects of radical right parties, without considering the possible effects of leftist populist parties or of parties' varying degrees of populism. Analyzing novel survey data across eight European publics, we analyze whether citizens' affective party evaluations broadly map onto these parties' varying degrees of populism, along with their Left-Right ideologies. We scale survey respondents' party feeling thermometer evaluations and social distance ratings of rival partisans using multidimensional scaling (MDS) to estimate a two-dimensional affective partisan space for each mass public, finding that in most (though not all) publics our mappings are strongly related to the parties' varying degrees of populism, as well as to Left-Right ideology. We substantiate these conclusions via analyses regressing respondents' affective ratings against exogenous measures of the parties' Left-Right ideologies and their degrees of populism. Our findings suggest that in many European publics, populism structures citizens' affective ratings of parties (and of their supporters) to roughly the same degree as Left-Right ideology.

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“…As Rama et al (2021) point out, the typical profile of Vox supporters is male, not necessarily educated, and—in contrast to those of many other populist radical-right parties in Europe—sometimes young. This bodes well for the party’s future and goes some way toward explaining Abascal’s use of Instagram in preference to other platforms such as Twitter and Facebook.…”

Section: Concluding Thoughtsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The gendered semiotics of far-right populism on Instagram: A case from Spain

Divita

2022

Discourse & Society

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Perhaps more than any other online social-networking platform, Instagram facilitates the construction and management of public image, serving as a potentially effective tool for political actors; nevertheless, it remains relatively understudied among digital communication strategies. In this article, I investigate the platform’s use by far-right populist politicians, turning to Santiago Abascal of Spain as a case study. Performing detailed analysis on a corpus of Abascal’s most popular posts determined by their “engagement rate,” I expose the gendered mode of self-presentation that resonates with Abascal’s public. In the second part of the article, I consider an equivalent corpus from President Pedro Sánchez, one of Abascal’s main political rivals at the time of writing. This comparative juxtaposition illustrates stark differences in approaches to social media and underscores how effective particular performances of masculinity can be for populist politicians. Ultimately, I aim to shed insight on the specific ways that Instagram serves far-right political projects, both in Spain and beyond.

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Vox

Cited by 140 publications

References 0 publications

Three Is a Crowd? Podemos, Ciudadanos, and Vox: The End of Bipartisanship in Spain

Three Is a Crowd? Podemos, Ciudadanos, and Vox: The End of Bipartisanship in Spain

Populism and the affective partisan space in nine European publics: Evidence from a cross-national survey

The gendered semiotics of far-right populism on Instagram: A case from Spain

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