Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: A ‘state of the art’ model

Counting on my vote not counting: Expressive voting in committees

“…In Rothenhäusler et al (2018), voters choose between an ethical and an unethical option, and suffer moral costs if the unethical option is collectively chosen -thus, ethical motivations are instrumental rather than expressive. Several papers model imperfectly informed committee members who, if they vote against the alternative that turns out to be optimal, receive a negative payoff, either directly (Midjord et al, 2017), or via reputation (Visser and Swank, 2007).…”

Robust Information Aggregation Through Voting

“…The payoff for a correct individual vote is not necessarily symmetric. The committee's decision may be more salient in one state of the world-for example, it has been suggested that regret for voting to convict an innocent defendant is higher than voting to let a guilty defendant free, Kaplan (1968), and in certain cases, the state of the world, say the quality of a pharmaceutical drug, is unlikely to be revealed if the committee votes not to approve the drug, Midjord et al (2017).…”

“…Anti-conformity/blame-guilt aversion: Conversely, agents may receive a payoff for voting against the majority. This may be due to anti-conformity motives (see references to social psychology in Callander (2008)) or because agents seek to avoid personal responsibility for an incorrect committee decision (Midjord et al 2017). This corresponds to increases in k α,b and k β,a and decreases in k α,a and k β,b .…”

“…This implies that information aggregation can be distorted by vote-contingent payoffs, examples of which include vote buying (Dal Bo (2007)), expressive motives (Feddersen et al (2009), Morgan and Vardy (2012)), a desire to vote for the winner (Callander (2007(Callander ( , 2008), and reputation payoffs (Visser and Swank (2007), Levy (2007), and Midjord et al (2017)).…”

Robust Information Aggregation Through Voting

“…Anti-conformity/blame-guilt aversion: Conversely, agents may receive a payoff for voting against the majority. This may be due to anti-conformity motives (see references to social psychology in Callander (2008)) or because agents seek to avoid personal responsibility for an incorrect committee decision (Midjord et al 2017). This corresponds to increases in k α,b and k β,a and decreases in k α,a and k β,b .…”