Voting by Simultaneous Vetoes

Kirneva, Margarita; Núñez, Matías

doi:10.1145/3465456.3467557

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2023

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“…All three papers implement maximal guarantees. Closer to home, Section 4 in Kirneva and Nunez (2021) explains the strategic properties of a veto mechanism implementing arbitrary compositions of our guarantee

normalvt false(n, p false)

.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

On guarantees, vetoes, and random dictators

Bogomolnaia

Holzman

Moulin

2023

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A mechanism guarantees a certain welfare level to its agents, if each of them can secure that level against unanimously adversarial others. How high can such a guarantee be, and what type of mechanism achieves it? In the n‐person probabilistic voting/bargaining model with p deterministic outcomes a guarantee takes the form of a probability distribution over the ranks from 1 to p. If n ≥ p, the uniform lottery is shown to be the only maximal (unimprovable) guarantee. If n < p, combining (variants of) the familiar random dictator and voting by veto mechanisms yields a large family of maximal guarantees: it is exhaustive if n = 2 and almost so if p ≤ 2 n. Voting rules à la Condorcet or Borda, even in probabilistic form, are ruled out by our worst case viewpoint.

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