2011
DOI: 10.1103/physreve.84.036115
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Voter model with non-Poissonian interevent intervals

Abstract: Recent analysis of social communications among humans has revealed that the interval between interactions for a pair of individuals and for an individual often follows a long-tail distribution. We investigate the effect of such a non-Poissonian nature of human behavior on dynamics of opinion formation. We use a variant of the voter model and numerically compare the time to consensus of all the voters with different distributions of interevent intervals and different networks. Compared with the exponential dist… Show more

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Cited by 43 publications
(52 citation statements)
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“…Some models display a disorderorder transition [7][8][9][10][11][12], from a regime in which opinions are arbitrarily diverse to one in which most individuals hold the same opinion. Other models focus the emergence of a global consensus [13][14][15][16][17][18], in which all agents finally share the same opinion.In this Letter, we propose an opinion model based on the evolutionary game. Evolutionary game theory as a powerful mathematical framework, has been widely used to understand cooperative behavior [19,20], traffic flow [21,22], epidemic spreading [23,24] and so on.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Some models display a disorderorder transition [7][8][9][10][11][12], from a regime in which opinions are arbitrarily diverse to one in which most individuals hold the same opinion. Other models focus the emergence of a global consensus [13][14][15][16][17][18], in which all agents finally share the same opinion.In this Letter, we propose an opinion model based on the evolutionary game. Evolutionary game theory as a powerful mathematical framework, has been widely used to understand cooperative behavior [19,20], traffic flow [21,22], epidemic spreading [23,24] and so on.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…[24,25,26]. Stark et al [24] introduced an update rule similar to our endogenous update and focused on consensus times.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We will see that the answer to this question depends crucially on the timing of interactions. Related work on the voter model, discussed later, include the papers by Stark et al [24], Baxter [25] and Takaguchi and Masuda [26]. In Sect.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Recently, the non-Markovian generalizations of the VM have been considered by introducing the latency period, the inertia effect, or non-Poissonian interevent interval distributions [23][24][25][26]. Non-Markovian dynamics of Ising-like systems with time-delayed interactions has also been studied in Refs.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%