Vote Buying in Argentina

Brusco, Valeria; Nazareno, Marcelo; Stokes, Susan C.

doi:10.1353/lar.2004.0022

Cited by 467 publications

(353 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Studies show that targeting of aid and bypassing the government is much more likely when the recipient government is nondemocratic and corrupt. As we know, clientelism and corruption pervade many polities, particularly in poor, developing areas (Wantchekon 2003;Brusco et al 2004, Keefer 2007Remmer 2007;Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci 2011;Hicken 2011;Stokes et al 2013). Singling out Uganda as a particularly egregious case, van de Walle notes that the typical form in Africa is what he calls Bprebendalism,^in which elites Bunambiguously subvert the rule of law for personal gain^ (van de Walle 2007, pp.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Citizen preferences and public goods: comparing preferences for foreign aid and government programs in Uganda

2016

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Different theories about the impact of aid make distinct predictions about citizens' attitudes toward foreign aid in recipient countries. We investigate their preferences toward aid and government projects in order to examine these different theories. Are citizens indifferent between development projects funded by their own government versus those funded by foreign aid donors, as aid capture theory suggests? To address this, in an experiment on a large, representative sample of Ugandan citizens, we randomly assigned the names of funding groups for actual forthcoming development projects and invited citizens to express support attitudinally and behaviorally. We find that citizens are significantly more willing to show behavioral support in favor of foreign aid projects compared to government programs, especially if they already perceive the government as corrupt or clientelist or if they are not supporters of the ruling party. They also trust donors more, think they are more effective, and do not consistently oppose aid conditionality. This experimental evidence is consistent with a theory that we call donor control which sees donors asbeing able to target and condition aid so that it is not fungible with government revenues and thus to be able to better direct it to meet citizens' needs.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Citizen preferences and public goods: comparing preferences for foreign aid and government programs in Uganda

2016

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“…Algunos autores definen al gasto en bienes privados o particularistas, particularmente al gasto en personal o empleo público, como patronazgo (patronage) Murillo, 2004;Melo;Pereira, 2013;Remmer, 2007;Robinson;Verdier, 2013;Van den Walle, 2007). Mientras que otros lo denominan como gasto clientelar (Carneiro, 2009;Gans-Morse;Mazzuca;Nichter, 2014;Kitschelt;Wilkinson, 2007;Magaloni;Díaz-Cayeros;Estevez, 2007;Stokes, 2007;Zarazaga, 2014) o compra de votos Stokes, 2004;Nichter, 2008), que es aquel que involucra el uso de recursos públicos (típicamente empleo públi-co) a cambio de apoyo electoral. Debido a la complejidad para observar los intercambios entre políticos entregando recursos públicos y votantes apoyándolos electoralmente, y para evitar las dificultades de medir clientelismo, una parte de la literatura ha tratado de definir y comparar el gasto del gobierno en distintos bienes y servicios (Weitz-Shapiro, 2012, p. 569).…”

Section: Definicionesunclassified

COALICIONES ELECTORALES, ESTABILIDAD DEL GABINETE Y GASTO SOCIAL PROVINCIAL: los casos de Buenos Aires, Córdoba y San Luis (1993-2009)

González

Cáceres

2017

Cad. CRH

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Por que alguns governos gastam mais em bens públicos que outros? Por que o gasto social varia? Este trabalho explora alguns fatores-chave que explicam a variação no gasto social de províncias argentinas. Estudamos essas províncias porque elas têm grande autonomia na decisão sobre os montantes a serem definidos como gasto social e porque existe grande variação nesse montante. A partir de dados originais do orçamento das províncias argentinas entre 1993 e 2009 e utilizando estatísticas descritivas e análises de três casos-chave (as províncias de Buenos Aires, San Luís e Córdoba), mostramos que o gasto social cresce à medida que diminuem os custos da articulação da coalizão eleitoral e da coalizão de governo, bem como a alternância e a rotatividade de cargos-chave no governo. O artigo discute os resultados nas três províncias argentinas selecionadas e explora as implicações da discussão sobre os determinantes políticos do gasto social e o desenho de políticas sociais, especialmente em países em desenvolvimento e democracias federais.

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“…The pathbreaking studies of Susan Stokes and colleagues exemplify the former strategy (Brusco, Nazareno, andStokes 2004, Stokes 2005). In this work, the authors indirectly infer the effect of the AB based on the difference in the declared influence of handouts on vote choice for Argentine survey respondents who cast ballots received from party operatives versus those who cast ballots received inside the polling station.…”

Section: Improvements Over Previous Studies Of the Abmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can Institutions Cure Clientelism? Assessing the Impact of the Australian Ballot in Brazil

Gingerich

2013

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent. Terms of use: Documents inThe unauthorized commercial use of Bank documents is prohibited and may be punishable under the Bank's policies and/or applicable laws. Copyright ©Inter-American Development Bank. This working paper may be reproduced for any non-commercial purpose. It may also be reproduced in any academic journal indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, with previous consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. This paper examines how the adoption of the Australian ballot (AB), and ipso facto, the transition from the nominal to effective secret vote, shaped the nature of party politics in Brazil. Engaging the literature on political clientelism, the impact of the AB on three outcomes is studied: 1) the ideological leanings of voters at the ballot box; 2) the degree of electoral control enjoyed by local vote brokers; and 3) the capacity of citizens to effectively participate in the electoral process. In order to get leverage on these issues, the paper utilizes an original dataset-painstakingly assembled from regional electoral archives-which contains municipal-level vote returns for federal deputy and senate contests during the period before and after the AB's introduction in Brazil (1958Brazil ( -1962. The dataset exploits the fact that the AB was introduced at different times in different states and for different offices in the country, thereby creating an unprecedented opportunity to assess the impact of this institution. Using a triple difference-in-difference procedure, the study finds that the AB: 1) shifted the ideological balance of power from Right to Left; 2) did not greatly weaken the hand of vote brokers; and 3) greatly increased the proportion of wasted votes cast in elections. Cataloging-in-PublicationJEL Classification: K, O17, D72, N4, N46

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Vote Buying in Argentina

Cited by 467 publications

References 29 publications

Citizen preferences and public goods: comparing preferences for foreign aid and government programs in Uganda

Citizen preferences and public goods: comparing preferences for foreign aid and government programs in Uganda

COALICIONES ELECTORALES, ESTABILIDAD DEL GABINETE Y GASTO SOCIAL PROVINCIAL: los casos de Buenos Aires, Córdoba y San Luis (1993-2009)

Can Institutions Cure Clientelism? Assessing the Impact of the Australian Ballot in Brazil

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