Vom ‚Scham-Ersparen’. Über Nietzsches fragiles Verständnis von Anerkennung in Abgrenzung zur französischen Verkennungslinie

Abstract

distance to the French strand. This thesis will be explored by considering the social practice of "shame" as a distinct example of recognition-based relation in concrete human life. The point of departure is Jean Paul Sartre's chapter on the gaze in "Being and Nothing" in order to better examine his understanding of shame as a concrete form of recognition. Different from Sartre, Nietzsche's understanding of shame can be interpreted as a fragile form of recognition in the concrete mode of living. Thereby, I aim to show that Nietzsche's understanding of recognition does not take Sartre's path in which the other is always reifying me, thus the other makes my freedom impossible. Such a process is so fragile that it is basically at risk of changing into a form of vulnerability. Nietzsche, however, basically makes room for its success, even though it is very difficult -recognition in the eye of its mutual vulnerability.