Vom Amt zur Agentur? Organisationsvielfalt, Anpassungsdruck und institutionelle Wandlungsprozesse im deutschen Verwaltungsmodell

Döhler, Marian

doi:10.1007/978-3-531-90560-0_1

Cited by 120 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…On the other hand, interactions in terms of anticipated reactions of the EC lead to a de facto weakened sanctioning power of the BMWi at the operational level. In sum, the analysis finds the BNetzA embedded in a dense accountability regime, and this corroborates the attested lack of genuine agency autonomy in Germany (Do¨hler, 2007).…”

Section: Biela and Papadopoulos 375supporting

confidence: 76%

The empirical assessment of agency accountability: a regime approach and an application to the GermanBundesnetzagentur

Biela

Papadopoulos

2014

International Review of Administrative Sciences

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Regulation has in many cases been delegated to independent agencies, which has led to the question of how democratic accountability of these agencies is ensured. There are few empirical approaches to agency accountability. We offer such an approach, resting upon three propositions. First, we scrutinize agency accountability both de jure (accountability is ensured by formal rights of accountability 'fora' to receive information and impose consequences) and de facto (the capability of fora to use these rights depends on resources and decision costs that affect the credibility of their sanctioning capacity). Second, accountability must be evaluated separately at political, operational and managerial levels. And third, at each level accountability is enacted by a system of several (partially) interdependent fora, forming together an accountability regime. The proposed framework is applied to the case of the German Bundesnetzagentur's accountability regime, which shows its suitability for empirical purposes.

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Section: Biela and Papadopoulos 375supporting

confidence: 76%

The empirical assessment of agency accountability: a regime approach and an application to the GermanBundesnetzagentur

Biela

Papadopoulos

2014

International Review of Administrative Sciences

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“…However, our findings on vertical specialization suggest an increasing hybridization of legal categories (see Do¨hler, 2007b, for a similar argument). In our sample, 52 (90) percent of the indirect (direct) agencies are subject to both functional and legal oversight.…”

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confidence: 44%

“…The existing repertoire of legal types provides policy-makers with a large number of organizational alternatives, which allows for the creation of hybrid legal types (Do¨hler, 2007b). This explains why policy-makers obviously perceived no need to create a new legal type ('executive agency').…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…In empirical terms, this relative autonomy of ministries regarding the management of subordinate agencies leads to significant differences between ministries with regard to the norms and practices of (functional) oversight (Bundesrechnungshof, 2007;. The separation between policy and operations is at the core of the (implicit) ideal-type model of administration in Germany (Do¨hler, 2007b). According to the normative doctrine of 'legislative programming' of the administration, all important policy decisions have to be taken by parliament, and the bureaucracy can act only after empowerment through a specific law.…”

mentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Also, the organizations in this category may be granted extended autonomy in terms of financial and personnel management compared to the core bureaucracy (Do¨hler, 2007b). Here we can distinguish three different legal types: (1) The large majority of indirect organizations are statutory bodies (Ko¨rperschaften), most of them running the social insurance system which dates back to the late nineteenth century.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Animals in the administrative zoo: organizational change and agency autonomy in Germany

Bach

Jann

2010

International Review of Administrative Sciences

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Although Germany does not figure among the 'forerunners' of managerial reforms of the public sector, it has a long tradition of agencies and non-departmental bodies at the federal level. Over time, the federal administration has developed into a highly differentiated 'administrative zoo' with a large number of species, questioning the image of a well-ordered German bureaucracy. The article addresses organizational changes among non-ministerial agencies during the past 20 years and ministry-agency relations, drawing on data from a comprehensive survey of the federal administration. The structural changes we observe are neither comprehensive nor planned; they are much more evolutionary than revolutionary, driven by sectoral policies and not by any overall agency policy, supported more by regulatory than by managerial reforms, and most of the changes are horizontal mergers or successions of existing organizations, while we find almost no evidence for hiving-off from ministries to agencies. At the same time, federal agencies report a lot of bureaucratic discretion, whereas they perceive substantial levels of 'red tape' due to administrative regulations. We also find that traditional, hierarchical modes of ministerial oversight are still dominating; only few agencies have performance agreements with measurable goals. Points for practitionersThe article will be of interest to practitioners concerned about the nature and direction of organizational change within government, especially about processes of horizontal and vertical differentiation and steering. It demonstrates that even in a highly developed and classical bureaucratic administrative system such as Germany there is and has for a

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Agenturbildung und Verwaltungssteuerung in der Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr

Richter

2014

Streitkräftemanagement

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Vom Amt zur Agentur? Organisationsvielfalt, Anpassungsdruck und institutionelle Wandlungsprozesse im deutschen Verwaltungsmodell

Abstract: Nutzungsbedingungen:Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine Weiterverbreitung -keine Bearbeitung)

Cited by 120 publications

References 28 publications

The empirical assessment of agency accountability: a regime approach and an application to the GermanBundesnetzagentur

The empirical assessment of agency accountability: a regime approach and an application to the GermanBundesnetzagentur

Animals in the administrative zoo: organizational change and agency autonomy in Germany

Agenturbildung und Verwaltungssteuerung in der Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr

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