VoltageIDS: Low-Level Communication Characteristics for Automotive Intrusion Detection System

Choi, Wonsuk; Joo, Kyungho; Jo, Hyo Jin; Park, Moon Chan; Lee, Dong Hoon

doi:10.1109/tifs.2018.2812149

Cited by 226 publications

(135 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…In [59], Choi et al proposed VoltageIDS, which uses unique electrical characteristics of the CAN signal like a fingerprint. The different locations of the ECUs with different lengths of wire results in different resistance [60] and the resistance changes the signal features.…”

Section: Physical Characteristic Based Idsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluation of CAN Bus Security Challenges

Bozdal

Samie

Aslam

et al. 2020

Sensors

112

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The automobile industry no longer relies on pure mechanical systems; instead, it benefits from many smart features based on advanced embedded electronics. Although the rise in electronics and connectivity has improved comfort, functionality, and safe driving, it has also created new attack surfaces to penetrate the in-vehicle communication network, which was initially designed as a close loop system. For such applications, the Controller Area Network (CAN) is the most-widely used communication protocol, which still suffers from various security issues because of the lack of encryption and authentication. As a result, any malicious/hijacked node can cause catastrophic accidents and financial loss. This paper analyses the CAN bus comprehensively to provide an outlook on security concerns. It also presents the security vulnerabilities of the CAN and a state-of-the-art attack surface with cases of implemented attack scenarios and goes through different solutions that assist in attack prevention, mainly based on an intrusion detection system (IDS).

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Section: Physical Characteristic Based Idsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluation of CAN Bus Security Challenges

Bozdal

Samie

Aslam

et al. 2020

Sensors

112

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show abstract

“…Analog signals are easily affected by external factors. In particular, temperature variation is one of the most critical concerns in device fingerprinting [29], [46], [53]. In order to show that HODOR properly operates under varying temperatures, UHF-band RF signals were sampled in an ice box with dry ice to maintain a certain temperature as shown in Fig.…”

Section: G Effects Of Temperature Variationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hold the Door! Fingerprinting Your Car Key to Prevent Keyless Entry Car Theft

Joo¹,

Choi²,

Lee³

2020

Proceedings 2020 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium

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Recently, the traditional way to unlock car doors has been replaced with a keyless entry system which proves more convenient for automobile owners. When a driver with a key fob is in the vicinity of the vehicle, doors automatically unlock on user command. However, unfortunately, it has been shown that these keyless entry systems are vulnerable to signal-relaying attacks. While it is evident that automobile manufacturers incorporate preventative methods to secure these keyless entry systems, they continue to be vulnerable to a range of attacks. Relayed signals result in valid packets that are verified as legitimate, and this makes it is difficult to distinguish a legitimate door unlock request from a malicious signal. In response to this vulnerability, this paper presents an RF-fingerprinting method (coined "HOld the DOoR", HODOR) to detect attacks on keyless entry systemsthe first attempt to exploit the RF-fingerprint technique in the automotive domain. HODOR is designed as a sub-authentication method that supports existing authentication systems for keyless entry systems and does not require any modification of the main system to perform. Through a series of experiments, the results demonstrate that HODOR competently and reliably detects attacks on keyless entry systems. HODOR achieves both an average false positive rate (FPR) of 0.27% with a false negative rate (FNR) of 0% for the detection of simulated attacks, corresponding to current research on keyless entry car theft. Furthermore, HODOR was also observed under environmental factors: temperature variation, non-line-of-sight (NLoS) conditions, and battery aging. HODOR yields a false positive rate of 1.32% for the identification of a legitimated key fob even under NLoS conditions. Based on the experimental results, it is expected that HODOR will provide a secure service for keyless entry systems, while remaining convenient.

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“…Cho and Shin (2016) [21] Spoofing Real Vehicle Simulation Ji (2018) [22] Injection and Suspension Attack Testbench Simulation Choi (2018) [23] Bus-Off Attack Real Vehicle Simulation Entropy Marchetti (2016) [24] Message Injection Real Vehicle Simulation Müter (2011) [25] Various Attacks Real Vehicle Simulation…”

Section: Cyber-physicalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Survey of Automotive Controller Area Network Intrusion Detection Systems

et al. 2019

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Novel attacks continue to appear against in-vehicle networks due to the increasing complexity of heterogeneous software and hardware components used in vehicles. These new components introduce challenges when developing efficient and adaptable security mechanisms. Several intrusion detection systems (IDS) have been proposed to identify and protect in-vehicle networks against malicious activities. We describe the state-of-the-art intrusion detection methods for securing automotive networks, with special focus on the Controller Area Network (CAN). We provide a description of vulnerabilities, highlight threat models, identify known attack vectors present in CAN, and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of suggested solutions. Keywords Controller area network, in-vehicle network, intrusion detection system Disciplines Electrical and Computer EngineeringAbstract-Novel attacks continue to appear against in-vehicle networks due to the increasing complexity of heterogeneous software and hardware components used in vehicles. These new components introduce challenges when developing efficient and adaptable security mechanisms. Several intrusion detection systems (IDS) have been proposed to identify and protect in-vehicle networks against malicious activities. We describe the stateof-the-art intrusion detection methods for securing automotive networks, with special focus on the Controller Area Network (CAN). We provide a description of vulnerabilities, highlight threat models, identify known attack vectors present in CAN, and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of suggested solutions.

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VoltageIDS: Low-Level Communication Characteristics for Automotive Intrusion Detection System

Cited by 226 publications

References 26 publications

Evaluation of CAN Bus Security Challenges

Evaluation of CAN Bus Security Challenges

Hold the Door! Fingerprinting Your Car Key to Prevent Keyless Entry Car Theft

Survey of Automotive Controller Area Network Intrusion Detection Systems

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