Visual perception from the perspective of a representational, non-reductionistic, level-dependent account of perception and conscious awareness

Abstract

This article proposes a new model to interpret seemingly conflicting evidence concerning the correlation of consciousness and neural processes. Based on an analysis of research of blindsight and subliminal perception, the reorganization of elementary functions and consciousness framework suggests that mental representations consist of functions at several different levels of analysis, including truly localized perceptual elementary functions and perceptual algorithmic modules, which are interconnections of the elementary functions. We suggest that conscious content relates to the ‘top level’ of analysis in a ‘situational algorithmic strategy’ that reflects the general state of an individual. We argue that conscious experience is intrinsically related to representations that are available to guide behaviour. From this perspective, we find that blindsight and subliminal perception can be explained partly by too coarse-grained methodology, and partly by top-down enhancing of representations that normally would not be relevant to action.

Perceptual awareness and its neural basis: bridging experimental and theoretical paradigms

“…In the past few years, the GNW model has inspired a new trend of theoretical developments in which series of discrete conscious processes, involving GW transitions, are considered as related to mental programmes controlling multiple steps or routines in cognitive tasks ( [48,54 -56], about the role of discreteness in perceptual processing). The GNW [34,47,57] model has led to the emphasis on the 'all-or-none' character of conscious representations, whereas other approaches ( [58]; see also [52]) suggest a graded account. Such positions might, however, be reconciled [25,59].…”

“…The notion of conscious access and related GW processing was endorsed by the philosopher Ned Block [18,19], who proposed the influential distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. According to Block, phenomenally conscious content is what differs between experiences such as of red and green, whereas access conscious content is content information that is broadcast in the GW (see, however, [52] for a different view). This proposal has had impact on debates about perceptual awareness and its neural basis [15,20,21].…”

“…Two crucial and complementary aspects of awareness research are given by the understanding of the constraints leading to conscious contents, and the understanding of the different properties and mechanisms of conscious and unconscious processing (for this aspect, see in particular [14,17]). Both these aspects are considered in depth, together with relevant foundational (see in particular [52]) and methodological (see in particular [92]) problems. Insights with patient studies are also considered and bridged with evidence from psychophysical experiments [52] In addition to a number of articles on visual awareness, articles in this Theme Issue cover auditory perception [56], multisensory perception [92] and the role of bodily signals for perceptual awareness [93].…”

“…Several contributions in the Theme Issue emphasize multiple levels of representation [25,52,59] and attempt to reconcile apparently contradictory findings about key aspects of the addressed problem. The Theme Issue includes efforts go beyond apparently conflicting theoretical positions, with special reference to dichotomous versus graded accounts of conscious representation [59] and about different theories of attention [25,38].…”

“…Studies on blindsight [66], the clinical condition in which a patient responds to visual stimuli without consciously perceiving them, have led to important insights on perceptual awareness (see also [52]). …”