This study showed that Elementary Perceiver and Memorizer (EPAM) can explain letter recognition phenomena earlier simulated by the connectionist Interactive Activation Model (IAM) of word perception (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981;Rumelhart & McClelland, 1982). EPAM, a model of learning and recognition in the form of a computer program, has previously successfully explained many aspects of learning and perception in a range of task environments (Feigenbaum & Simon, 1984). This study shows that the human data modeled by the IAM are at least as accurately simulated by EPAM. The fact that one model (EPAM) processes perceptions serially and the other (IAM) processes them in parallel plays no essential role in producing the observed context effects. Both connectionist and serial symbolic simulations can be designed to exhibit these effects.Progress in cognitive psychology in recent years has resulted in the production of a number of rather distinct theories to account for the basic processes of perception and cognition. Before we examine the differences between two of these theories, which is the main task of this article, we need to emphasize what all of the theories have in common.1. They characterize perceptual and cognitive processes as information processes.2. They are computational: They are described with such specificity that they can be, and are, programmed for digital computers. Hence, their predictions can be compared with data at a relatively fine level of concrete detail.3. They are quite general. That is, they model and make predictions for a wide range of perceptual and cognitive performances, not just for performance on one task or a few closely similar tasks.Among the theories that share these characteristics are the connectionist models put forward by Rumelhart (1981, Rumelhart &McClelland, 1982), the Elementary Perceiver and Memorizer (EPAM) theory of Feigenbaum and Simon (1962, 1984), John Anderson's (1983 ACT*, and Rosenbloom and Newell's (1982) SOAR. The first of these models describes thinking without the use of symbols, that is, based on patterns of activation in network-like structures. The other three accept the physical symbol system hypothesis , that intelligence is produced by the processing of symbols in a physical system capable of such processing.Although all four theories have considerable generality, their ranges are not quite coterminous. SOAR makes perhaps the broadest claims to generality, but it has been elaborated mainly