Visual experience: rich but impenetrable

Abstract

According to so-called "thin" views about the content of experience, we can only visually experience low-level features such as colour, shape, texture or motion. According to so-called "rich" views, we can also visually experience some high-level properties, such as being a pine tree or being threatening. One of the standard objections against rich views is that high-level properties can only be represented at the level of judgment. In this paper, I first challenge this objection by relying on some recent studies in social vision. Secondly, I tackle a different but related issue, namely, the idea that, if the content of experience is rich, then perception is cognitively penetrable. Against this thesis, I argue that the very same criteria that help us vindicate the truly sensory nature of our rich experiences speak against their being cognitively penetrable.Keywords: visual experience; high-level properties; low-level properties; cognitive penetrability; social vision. Acknowledgements 2 Visual experience: rich but impenetrable AbstractAccording to so-called "thin" views about the content of experience, we can only visually experience low-level features such as colour, shape, texture or motion. According to so-called "rich" views, we can also visually experience some high-level properties, such as being a pine tree or being threatening. One of the standard objections against rich views is that high-level properties can only be represented at the level of judgment. In this paper, I first challenge this objection by relying on some recent studies in social vision. Secondly, I tackle a different but related issue, namely, the idea that, if the content of experience is rich, then perception is cognitively penetrable. Against this thesis, I argue that the very same criteria that help us vindicate the truly sensory nature of our rich experiences speak against their being cognitively penetrable.

Recent issues in high‐level perception

“…If we can perceive high‐level features, this capacity might be the result of some kind of cognitive influence on perception, but it might not. Instead, this capacity might be innate, perhaps of the sort which permits fine‐tuning during a subject's developmental period but which is relatively fixed in the mature subject (Toribio, ). Likewise, if our perceptual experiences are cognitively penetrable, this fact might result in the perception of high‐level features, but it might not.…”

“…Recently, several theorists have proposed that we can perceive a range of high‐level features, including natural kind features (e.g., being a cat ), artifactual features (e.g., being a hammock ), and event‐causal features (e.g., being the cause of a hammock's bulge ; Bayne, ; Butterfill, ; O'Callaghan, ; Scholl & Tremoulet, ; Siegel, , , ). Other recently proposed high‐level percepts include agency features (e.g., being oneself the cause of a window's shattering ), action features (e.g., being graspable ), the emotional and intentional features of others (e.g., being surprised ), social features (e.g., being masculine ), and moral features (Bayne, , ; Begby, ; Block, ; Butterfill, , ; Cullison, ; Di Bona, In preparation; Fish ; Helton, ; Masrour, ; Nanay, , ; Scholl & Gao, ; Siegel, , , ; Toribio, , ; Van Gulick, ; Wisnewski, ).…”

High-Level Perception and Multimodal Perception

“…have expressed scepticism about the possibility of framing the debate in terms friendly to the relationalist (Brogaard & Chomanski 2015;Cavedon-Taylor 2015), for the purposes of this paper I will assume that 'represents' and its cognates can be treated by relationalists as 'acquaints one with' and its cognates (see Siegel 2006;Silins 2013;Reiland 2014;Logue 2013;Bengson 2013;Nanay 2013;Toribio 2018;Di Bona 2017). Indeed, a number of relationalists have weighed in on the debate, some in favour of Liberalism (Fish 2009(Fish , 2013Johnston 2006), others in favour of Conservatism (Martin 2010) and some arguing that there is no fact of the matter (Logue 2013).…”

“…For instance, some hold that we can know others' minds via perception (McDowell 1982;McNeill 2012;Cassam 2007) and some claim that we can know what is the morally right thing to do via perception (Audi 2013;Cuneo 2003;McBrayer 2010). It is not always clear whether such philosophers think of mental and moral properties as represented in perception, rather than in perceptual belief (though see Werner 2016;Brogaard 2016;Toribio 2018;and Newen 2017). But insofar as any philosopher would wish to articulate a fully perceptual epistemology of others' minds and moral knowledge, they would thereby require the truth of Liberalism.…”

Recent Issues in High-Level Perception

“…2014; Butterfill, 2009Butterfill, , 2015Cullison, 2010;Di Bona, In preparation;Fish 2013;Helton, 2015;Masrour, 2011;Nanay, 2011Nanay, , 2012Scholl & Gao, 2013;Siegel, 2005Siegel, , 2010Siegel, , 2014Toribio, 2015aToribio, , 2015bVan Gulick, 1994;Wisnewski, 2015).…”