Visual experience in the predictive brain is univocal, but indeterminate

Nave, Kathryn

doi:10.1007/s11097-021-09747-w

Cited by 7 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 60 publications

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“…Still unsolved is the problem of the criterion that makes it possible to distinguish between personal and sub-personal states in PP, problems of consciousness and phenomenology (cf. Clark, 2017;Dołęga & Dewhurst, 2021;Hohwy & Seth, 2021;Hutto 2017;Marvan & Havlík, 2020;Nave, 2021;Schlicht & Dołęga, 2021;Wilkinson, 2014). These are promising research areas.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding Predictive Processing. A Review

2021

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The purpose of this paper is to provide a systematic review of the Predictive Processing framework (hereinafter PP) and to identify its basic theoretical difficulties. For this reason, it is, primarily, polemic-critical and, secondarily, historical. I discuss the main concepts, positions and research issues present within this framework ( §1-2). Next, I present the Bayesian-brain thesis ( §3) and the difficulty associated with it ( §4). In §5, I compare the conservative and radical approach to PP and discuss the internalist nature of the generative model in the context of Markov blankets. The possibility of linking PP with the free energy principle (hereinafter FEP) and the homeostatic nature of predictive mechanisms is discussed in §6. This is followed by the presentation of PP's difficulties with solving the dark room problem and the exploration-exploitation trade-off ( §7). I emphasize the need to integrate PP with other models and research frameworks within cognitive science. Thus, this review not only discusses PP, but also provides an assessment of the condition of this research framework in the light of the hopes placed on it by many researchers. The Conclusions section discuss further research challenges and the epistemological significance of PP.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding Predictive Processing. A Review

2021

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Framing the predictive mind: why we should think again about Dreyfus

Reynolds

2024

Phenom Cogn Sci

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In this paper I return to Hubert Dreyfus’ old but influential critique of artificial intelligence, redirecting it towards contemporary predictive processing models of the mind (PP). I focus on Dreyfus’ arguments about the “frame problem” for artificial cognitive systems, and his contrasting account of embodied human skills and expertise. The frame problem presents as a prima facie problem for practical work in AI and robotics, but also for computational views of the mind in general, including for PP. Indeed, some of the issues it presents seem more acute for PP, insofar as it seeks to unify all cognition and intelligence, and aims to do so without admitting any cognitive processes or mechanisms outside of the scope of the theory. I contend, however, that there is an unresolved problem for PP concerning whether it can both explain all cognition and intelligent behavior as minimizing prediction error with just the core formal elements of the PP toolbox, and also adequately comprehend (or explain away) some of the apparent cognitive differences between biological and prediction-based artificial intelligence, notably in regard to establishing relevance and flexible context-switching, precisely the features of interest to Dreyfus’ work on embodied indexicality, habits/skills, and abductive inference. I address several influential philosophical versions of PP, including the work of Jakob Hohwy and Andy Clark, as well as more enactive-oriented interpretations of active inference coming from a broadly Fristonian perspective.

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How preferences enslave attention: calling into question the endogenous/exogenous dichotomy from an active inference perspective

Parvizi-Wayne

2024

Phenom Cogn Sci

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It is easy to think of attention as a purely sensorimotor, exogenous mechanism divorced from the influence of an agent’s preferences and needs. However, according to the active inference framework, such a strict reduction cannot be straightforwardly invoked, since all cognitive and behavioural processes can at least be described as maximising the evidence for a generative model entailed by the ongoing existence of that agent; that is, the minimisation of variational free energy. As such, active inference models could cast an (embodied) cognitive mechanism like attention, described in this paper as a relevance filter, as constrained (or enslaved) by these prior preferences for which an agent must seek evidence, whether or not such priors are having direct, real-time neurocognitive effects on the sensorimotor loops that couple the attending agent and her surrounding environment. This duality with respect to the role of priors corresponds to a wider, ongoing debate in the active inference community regarding the framework’s explanatory power. More specifically, the debate centres on whether the notion of a generative model and the priors embedded ubiqitously therein act as a purely useful instrumental tool for scientists aiming to model the behaviours of self-organising entities, or, rather, the brain (and body) is genuinely constituted by a predictive hierarchy within which higher-order dynamics constrain and contextualise activity unfolding at lower levels. With a focus on the second (ontologically realist) construal of active inference presented here, this paper argues that in cognitive systems endowed with attentional schema, higher-order preferences do, indeed, impose a demonstrable and powerful modulating effect on the way attention unfolds. Furthermore, these preferences in question transcend the contingent, task-relevant goals that have already been shown to bias attention. Rather, attention is powerfully tuned by the most-deep rooted priors the agent possesses, such that, when sensory evidence against these priors is observed and free energy spikes, the agent attentionally prioritises the homeostatic restoration of these preferred states over their shorter-term desires. This suggests that, at its core, attention is a goal-driven process, which calls into question the putative dichotomy that exists between endogenous (goal-directed) attention and exogenous (stimulus-driven) attention. What emerges in its place is a symbiotic relationship between attention and preferences, whereby the fulfilment of the latter rests on successful application of the former, and the former derives its function from the organismic need to find evidence for the latter.

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Visual experience in the predictive brain is univocal, but indeterminate

Cited by 7 publications

References 60 publications

Understanding Predictive Processing. A Review

Understanding Predictive Processing. A Review

Framing the predictive mind: why we should think again about Dreyfus

How preferences enslave attention: calling into question the endogenous/exogenous dichotomy from an active inference perspective

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