Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?

Abstract

was widely reported and analyzed. Yet accounts of the failure of these talks and the subsequent controversial talks in Taba, Egypt (21-27 January 2001) diverge widely in their descriptions of what transpired and in the attribution of blame for their failure. 1 Division of discourse about Camp David into dominant and revisionist narratives is inadequate. There is a tension between the goal of social science to reduce the complexity of social reality through the construction of parsimonious models and the need to refrain from oversimplification that significantly distorts reality. I hope that the interpretive approach applied in this essay more closely approximates the complexity of reality by complicating the model at the price of parsimony. 2 I employ a model that elucidates the differences between conflicting explanations for the failure of the summit negotiations at Camp David. No less important, I examine the internal divisions within the schools and areas of agreement between them, both of which have been insufficiently analyzed. This interpretation of positions and the evaluation of the role of culture offer a fuller understanding of the breakdown of the peace process and the "Labor Party-Arafat axis." 3

The necessity of observing real life situations: Palestinian‐Israeli violence as a laboratory for learning about social behaviour

“…First, the Prime Minister of Israel, Ehud Barak, built an expectation that the July 2000 Camp David Conference was the critical time for reaching the final decisions in the negotiation process with the Palestinians (Edelist, 2003;Pressman, 2003;Wolfsfeld, 2004;Sher, 2001). Second, when these negotiations failed, Barak provided further major information by saying that (1) he had done all he could, turning every stone in search for peace by making a very generous and far-reaching offer at Camp David, an offer that Arafat refused to accept, and (2) Arafat did not make counter proposals; thus delegating the responsibility for the failure solidly to the Palestinians (Edelist, 2003;Pressman, 2003;Wolfsfeld, 2004). This information was supported by statements of USA President Bill Clinton and of all Israeli participants at the Camp David conference.…”

“…It implied that the goal of the Palestinians was not to resolve the conflict peacefully, but to destroy Israel. Later, when the violence began, following the visit of Ariel Sharon's visit to Temple Mount, major information coming from the Israeli government was that the outbreak of Al Aqsa Intifada had been well-prepared by Arafat and the Palestinian Authority (Dor, 2004;Pressman, 2003;Wolfsfeld, 2004).…”

“…But it is beyond the scope of the present paper to analyse the nature of these developments. In June 2000, the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak concluded that time had come to try to complete the ongoing negotiations with the final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Edelist, 2003;Sher, 2001 (Edelist, 2003;Pressman, 2003).…”

“…Palestinians began disturbances accompanied by stone throwing, demonstrations and shootings. These were met with a forceful response by the Israel security forces, and in the first four days 39 Palestinians and six Israelis were killed; within a month the toll rose to over 130 Palestinians and 12 Israelis (Dor, 2001;Pressman, 2003).…”

A geopolítica e o conflito Palestino-Israelense: dos Acordos de Oslo à Primavera Árabe

“…Quanto a este último ponto, os direitos palestinos se limitariam ao "custódio" dos lugares santos cristãos e muçulmanos e uma administração civil nos bairros de maioria palestina. (PRESSMAN, 2003a …”