Vision without representation

Gangopadhyay, Nivedita; Madary, Michael; Spicer, Finn; Noë, Alva

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199551118.003.0013

Cited by 206 publications

(310 citation statements)

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“…Non-orthodox views about the mind often combine a rejection of both representationalism and the classical sandwich idea of perception and action (Chemero 2009;Noë 2010;Wilson 2010). Indeed, the smart perception account of action-understanding as developed by Gallagher is recently integrated into an "Interaction theory" of social cognition (De Jaegher et al 2010) which claims that social interactive processes are explanatory of social cognition without reference to internal representations and internal mechanisms.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…At the other end of the spectrum are theories which favour an inseparability of perceptual awareness from the perceiver's sensorimotor skills. This school of thought is designated by names such as "enactivism", "sensorimotor theory" and "actionism" (Hurley 1998;Noë 2004Noë , 2010O'Regan and Noë 2001;Kiverstein 2010). I shall call this group of theories 'action-oriented' accounts of perceptual experience.…”

Section: Smart Perception and Extended Mind: Going Wild Scenariomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, in general, appeal to the notion of mental representations for explaining the mind remains the distinguishing feature of traditional theories. Indeed, discarding the idea of mental representations is often the first step taken by non-orthodox views when they attempt to construct theories outside the traditional paradigm (Noë 2004(Noë , 2010Chemero 2009;Garzón 2008). A recent general definition of mental representation offered by Dietrich and Markman (2003) somewhat captures the gist of the notion.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is to be noted that action-oriented theories differ among themselves on many important details, for example, on the notion of "action"(Noë 2010;Gangopadhyay & Kiverstein 2009). …”

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confidence: 99%

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The extended mind: born to be wild? A lesson from action-understanding

Gangopadhyay

2011

Phenom Cogn Sci

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The extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58(1): 7-19, 1998;Clark 2008) is an influential hypothesis in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I argue that the extended mind hypothesis is born to be wild. It has undeniable and irrepressible tendencies of flouting grounding assumptions of the traditional information-processing paradigm. I present case-studies from social cognition which not only support the extended mind proposal but also bring out its inherent wildness. In particular, I focus on cases of action-understanding and discuss the role of embodied intentionality in the extended mind project. I discuss two theories of action-understanding for exploring the support for the extended mind hypothesis in embodied intersubjective interaction, namely, simulation theory and a non-simulationist perceptual account. I argue that, if the extended mind adopts a simulation theory of action-understanding, it rejects representationalism. If it adopts a non-simulationist perceptual account of action-understanding, it rejects the classical sandwich view of the mind.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Smart Perception and Extended Mind: Going Wild Scenariomentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is to be noted that action-oriented theories differ among themselves on many important details, for example, on the notion of "action"(Noë 2010;Gangopadhyay & Kiverstein 2009). …”

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confidence: 99%

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The extended mind: born to be wild? A lesson from action-understanding

Gangopadhyay

2011

Phenom Cogn Sci

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“…With the rise of the embodied paradigm (Chemero 2009;Barsalou 2008;Clark 1997Clark , 2008Thompson 2007;Gallagher 2005;Noë 2004;Varela et al 1991) the debate has moved into a new phase. Within the embodied framework, which is characterized by a spectrum of different formulations, two distinct approaches have been particularly distinguished for their nonrepresentationalist leanings 1 : enactivism (Thomas 1999(Thomas , 2009(Thomas , 2014Thompson 2007) and the sensorimotor theory (O'Regan andBlock 2012, O'Regan 2011;Noë 2004Noë , 2010O'Regan and Noë 2001). Although one might be under the impression that the position held by some advocates of enactivism is fully compatible with the view defended by sensorimotor theorists, we will argue that there are valid reasons to think that the two are not to be lumped together or used interchangeably.…”

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confidence: 99%

A New Imagery Debate: Enactive and Sensorimotor Accounts

Foglia

Ο’Regan

2015

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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Traditionally, the BImagery Debate^has opposed two main camps: depictivism and descriptivism. This debate has essentially focused on the nature of the internal representations thought to be involved in imagery, without addressing at all the question of action. More recently, a third, Bembodied^view is moving the debate into a new phase. The embodied approach focuses on the interdependence of perception, cognition and action, and in its more radical line this approach promotes the idea that perception is not a process involving internal world-models (representations). The anti-representationalist version of the embodied paradigm covers, among others that we shall not discuss here, two quite different positions, namely the enactive approach and sensorimotor theory. Up to now these two anti-representationalist accounts have generally been confounded. In this paper we will argue that despite some important commonalities, enactive and sensorimotor accounts come with distinctive theoretical traits with regard to their approach to imagery. These become manifest when critically examining the role they assign to sensorimotor engagements with the world. We shall argue that enactive and sensorimotor approaches are different in their understanding of the role of embodied action, and these different notions of embodiment lead to different explanatory accounts of perception and imagery. We propose that, due to existing ambiguities in enactivism, the sensorimotor theory is a better framework for a skill-based approach to imagery.

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The role of embodied scaffolding in revealing “enactive potentialities” in intergenerational science exploration

Nygren,

Price,

Thomas Jha

2023

Science Education

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Although adults are known to play an important role in young children's development, little work has focused on the enactive features of scaffolding in informal learning settings, and the embodied dynamics of intergenerational interaction. To address this gap, this paper undertakes a microinteractional analysis to examine intergenerational collaborative interaction in a science museum setting. The paper presents a fine‐grained moment‐by‐moment analysis of video‐recorded interaction of children and their adult carers around science‐themed objects. Taking an enactive cognition perspective, the analysis enables access to subtle shifts in interactants’ perception, action, gesture, and movement to examine how young children engage with exhibits, and the role adult action plays in supporting young children's engagement with exhibits and developing ideas about science. Our findings demonstrate that intergenerational “embodied scaffolding” is instrumental in making “enactive potentialities” in the environment more accessible for children, thus deepening and enriching children's engagement with science. Adult action is central to revealing scientific dimensions of objects’ interaction and relationships in ways that expose novel types of perception and action opportunities in shaping science experiences and meaning making. This has implications for science education practices since it foregrounds not only “doing” science, through active hands‐on activities, but also speaks to the interconnectedness between senses and the role of the body in thinking. Drawing on the findings, this paper also offers design implications for informal science learning environments.

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Vision without representation

Cited by 206 publications

References 0 publications

The extended mind: born to be wild? A lesson from action-understanding

The extended mind: born to be wild? A lesson from action-understanding

A New Imagery Debate: Enactive and Sensorimotor Accounts

The role of embodied scaffolding in revealing “enactive potentialities” in intergenerational science exploration

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