Violence and the formation of hopelessness: Evidence from internally displaced persons in Colombia

Moya, Andrés; Carter, Michael R.

doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.08.015

Cited by 35 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…The literature on victims of domestic and criminal violence underscores the lingering effects in the way of feelings of helplessness, grief, loss of interest, and other impacts (e.g., Bargai, Ben-Shakhar, & Shalev, 2007;Kluft, Bloom, & Kinzie, 2000;Maguire and Corbett, 1987;Shepherd, 1990). This is echoed in the literature on victims of conflict, particularly those who suffer violence and displacement (Egbuagu, Ugwu, & Ibeawuchi, 2018;Moya & Carter, 2019;Roberts et al, 2009). Though studies among the Rohingya are sparse, one earlier study at the Kutupalong camps suggested high levels of depression and significant levels of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Riley, Varner, Ventevogel, Taimur Hasan, & Welton-Mitchell, 2017).…”

Section: Challenges Faced In Initiating Disaster Risk Reduction In Thmentioning

confidence: 98%

Risk Communication for Empowerment: Interventions in a Rohingya Refugee Settlement

Lejano

Rahman²,

Kabir³

2020

Risk Analysis

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There are many reasons that people, when warned of an impending extreme event, do not take proactive, self-defensive action. We focus on one possible reason, which is that, sometimes, people lack a sense of agency or even experience disempowerment, which can lead to passivity. This article takes up one situation where the possibility of disempowerment is salient, that of Rohingya refugees who were evicted from their homes in Myanmar and forced to cross the border into neighboring Bangladesh. In their plight, we see the twin elements of marginalization and displacement acting jointly to produce heightened vulnerability to the risks from extreme weather. Building on a relational model of risk communication, a consortium of researchers and practitioners designed a risk communication training workshop that featured elements of empowerment-based practice. The program was implemented in two refugee camps. Evaluation suggests that the workshop may have had an appreciable effect in increasing participants' sense of agency and hope, while decreasing their level of fatalism. The outcomes were considerably more positive for female than male participants, which has important implications. This work underscores the potential for participatory modes of risk communication to empower the more marginalized, and thus more vulnerable, members of society.

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Section: Challenges Faced In Initiating Disaster Risk Reduction In Thmentioning

confidence: 98%

Risk Communication for Empowerment: Interventions in a Rohingya Refugee Settlement

Lejano

Rahman²,

Kabir³

2020

Risk Analysis

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“…It has been argued that this cognitive toll makes people concentrate on the worries, distracting attention from the ongoing decisions, which may induce counterproductive behaviour, such as lack of adherence to medication, unsafe sex, inability to comply with saving plans, procrastination etc. Asset losses can also dampen the beliefs about what it is achievable in the future (Ibáñez and Moya 2010;Moya and Carter 2019). Therefore, we expect that through these alternative channels, negative shocks affect behaviour, inducing counterproductive choices in health (H7) (e.g.…”

Section: Shocks and Outcomesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We learned from the literature on violence that mental health pathologies such as depression, chronic anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder, induced by victimization, may cause a state of despair, negative perceptions regarding the future, and hopelessness (Abramson, Metalsky and Alloy 1989;Sympson 2000;Yehuda 2002;Moya and Carter 2019). We also know that negative shocks during the lockdown are associated with stress, depression, and anxiety (Codagnone et al 2020).…”

Section: Shocks and Outcomesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Restarting “normal” life after Covid-19 and the lockdown: Evidence from Spain, the United Kingdom, and Italy

Codagnone¹,

Bogliacino²,

Gómez³

et al. 2020

Preprint

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Currently, unprecedented series of events are taking place that affect the institutional structure of the world economy and the social fabric of our societies. In this article, we examine the expectations of the economic outlook, fear of the future, and behavioural change during the lockdown, for three European countries (Spain, the United Kingdom, and Italy) that have been severely hit by Covid-19. We use a novel data source that we collected to monitor the three countries during the pandemic. As outcome variables, we use expectations (e.g., economic outlook, labour market situation, recovery), fear (e.g., scenario of new outburst, economic depression, restriction to individual rights and freedom), and behavioural change across the following dimensions: savings, cultural consumption, social capital, and risky behaviour. After providing descriptive evidence that is representative of the population of interest, using longitudinal data from the same survey on exposure to shocks and matching techniques, we estimate the impact of exposure to shock occurred during the crisis on the same outcome variables.

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“…We first exploit the panel data nature of our data. We control for household fixed effects ( ) that absorb all time-invariant unoservables, such as risks and time preferences or direct victimization during times of conflict, which determine households' ability to cope with shocks and are also shaped by the legacies of conflict (Bauer et al 2016;Moya 2018;Moya and Carter 2019;Voors et al 2012). Other unobservable dynamics correlated with rebelocracy levels might bias our coefficient estimates.…”

Section: Estimates For Welfare and Agricultural Productionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2 Over the long term, countries may recover from physical and human capital destruction if a threshold is not exceeded (Justino and Verwimp 2013;Miguel and Roland 2011;Murdoch and Sandler 2002). However, the legacy of conflict can be long lasting through the negative impacts of conflict on children while in utero or during early childhood (Camacho 2008;Ichino and Winter-Ebmer 2004;León 2012), changes in preferences and behaviour (Bauer et al 2016;Moya 2018;Moya and Carter 2019;Voors et al 2012), and institutional transformations (Arjona 2016;Gilligan et al 2014;Justino and Stojetz 2018;Kalyvas et al 2008;Mampilly 2011;Tilly 1992).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effects of wartime institutions on households’ ability to cope with shocks: Evidence for Colombia

Arteaga¹,

Campo²,

Arjona³

et al. 2019

WIDER Working Paper

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.Abstract: This paper studies the legacies of wartime institutions, measured as rebelocracy, on the ability of households to cope with negative income shocks. Rebelocracy is the social order established by non-state armed actors in the communities they control. By providing public goods and a predictable framework within which to operate, rebelocracy may generate incentives for households to expand production and accumulate wealth, placing them in a higher income trajectory than households living in war zones amid violence and chaos. If these better economic conditions persist after non-state armed actors leave the territory, households in communities that had stronger rebelocracy levels will be better able to cope with negative income shocks. The empirical strategy identifies households' responses to random weather shocks and estimates their heterogeneous impact by the level of rebelocracy. Using a household panel in four conflict regions in Colombia, the estimation controls for time-invariant unobservables. The study finds that in regions with strong rebelocracy, households are better able to cope with negative weather shocks than those living in regions with non-state armed actor presence but with limited or no intervention. The former households face a lower economic impact of weather shocks and resort less to survival migration. The effect of rebelocracy is driven mostly by the provision of public goods by non-state armed actors. While this paper is not claiming causal impacts of rebelocracy, its coefficient estimates are robust to controlling for confounders that may explain rebelocracy in the first place.

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Violence and the formation of hopelessness: Evidence from internally displaced persons in Colombia

Cited by 35 publications

References 39 publications

Risk Communication for Empowerment: Interventions in a Rohingya Refugee Settlement

Risk Communication for Empowerment: Interventions in a Rohingya Refugee Settlement

Restarting “normal” life after Covid-19 and the lockdown: Evidence from Spain, the United Kingdom, and Italy

The effects of wartime institutions on households’ ability to cope with shocks: Evidence for Colombia

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