Vieillissement de la population, pouvoir électoral, système de retraites et croissance

Artus, Patrick; Legros, Florence

doi:10.2307/3502705

Cited by 2 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…One example is offered in Artus and Legros (1997), who assume that the production Y (t) from firms has constant returns to capital and to labor. As they do, we also consider a constant unemployment rate.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We consider a version in continuous time of the model by Artus and Legros (1997). Age is continuous and people are placed into two classes, representing possibly active young people and old pensioners.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They introduced some macro-economic uncertainty through simulating Markov perturbations on productivity and on population growth, but mainly addressed the question of the optimality of the equilibrium allocation. Artus and Legros (1997) examined how a pension system can deviate from optimality if a particular group of people (young or old) is favored.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Viability of pay-as-you-go systems

Aubin

Bonneuil²,

Maurin

et al. 2001

Journal of Evolutionary Economics

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When the dependency ratio inactive/active increases to intolerable proportions, the question arises as to how and when pay-as-you-go social security systems can be controlled so as to safeguard a decent way of life to everyone. Between uncertainty linked to wages and the interest rate, and room to manoeuvre the age of retirement and the immediate transfer from workers to pensioners, not just any route permits this objective. The set of those which do is here delineated (the viability kernel tube), and the operations at any time necessary to control trajectories so as they remain in this set are identified (the regulation map). Finally, the flexibility necessary to avoid failure, from any state reached by the pay-as-you-go system, is inferred in timing and magnitude.

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Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Viability of pay-as-you-go systems

Aubin

Bonneuil²,

Maurin

et al. 2001

Journal of Evolutionary Economics

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“…Leaving the majority voting political setting, some authors (e.g. Verbon, 1987, 1988, Verbon and Verhoeven, 1992, Verhoeven and Verbon, 1991or Artus and Legros, 1997 consider a government able to impose policies to citizens, which may be influenced by different pressure groups. Such a government objective function could then be written as…”

Section: Alternative Political Processesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voting on Pensions: A Survey

Walque

2005

J Economic Surveys

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The paper presents a nonexhaustive survey of the literature designed to explain emergence, size and political sustainability of pay-as-you-go pension systems. It proposes a simple framework of analysis (a small, open, two overlapping generation economy model), around which some variants are displayed. Dictatorship of the median voter is assumed. The text is organized to answer the following questions: (i) Do political equilibria with PAYG pension schemes exist? (ii) Why do they emerge? (iii) What are the conditions for the participation constraint of the pension game to be verified?, and finally, (iv) What is the size of the pension system chosen by the median voter and how is this size influenced by an exogenous (e.g. demographic) shock?

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Vieillissement de la population, pouvoir électoral, système de retraites et croissance

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Viability of pay-as-you-go systems

Viability of pay-as-you-go systems

Voting on Pensions: A Survey

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