Community centrality is a growing requirement of social science. The field's research practices are increasingly expected to conform to prescribed relationships with the people studied. Expectations about community centrality influence scholarly activities. These expectations can pressure social scientists to adhere to models of community involvement that are immediate and that include community-based co-investigators, advisory boards, and liaisons. In this context, disregarding community centrality can be interpreted as failure. This paper considers evolving norms about the centrality of community in social science. It problematises community inclusion and discusses concerns about the impact of community centrality on incremental theory development, academic integrity, freedom of speech, and the value of liberal versus communitarian knowledge. Through the application of a constructivist approach, this paper argues that social science in which community is omitted or on the periphery is not failed science, because not all social science requires a community base to make a genuine and valuable contribution. The utility of community centrality is not necessarily universal across all social science pursuits. The practices of knowing within social science disciplines may be difficult to transfer to a community. These practices of knowing require degrees of specialisation and interest that not all communities may want or have.