Vetoes in the Early Republic: A Defense of Norms

Abstract

The first six presidents (1789–1829) vetoed bills far less frequently than their successors. Previous literature affords two competing explanations for this phenomenon. The constitutional norms approach contends that the early presidents used the veto only to reject unconstitutional legislation. The veto bargaining approach argues that the early presidents vetoed fewer bills because the electoral conditions under which vetoes typically occur had yet to emerge. This article accepts some of the insights of the veto bargaining approach, but defends a corrected version of the norms account. This account says the early presidents vetoed fewer bills because they were constrained by a norm according to which “adversarial” vetoes were considered illegitimate. The emergence of the modern veto required discursive legitimation of vetoes for adversarial purposes.

Analyzing arguments in executive veto messages

“…In terms of time, the model suggests that the odds of constitutional arguments are significantly declining over the course of administrations. This finding matches well with Figure 4 above as well as prior literature (Latimer, 2017;McCarty, 2009).…”

“…Without the protection of the veto, the executive branch would soon find itself at the mercy of legislative majorities. Indeed, a number of studies consider the extent to which early presidents relied on the Constitution to justify the use of their executive veto powers (Latimer, 2017; McCarty, 2009). While previous scholars have primarily focused on the antebellum period when they consider constitutionally based argumentation in veto messages, Watson (1993) offers one, if not the only, analysis of twentieth‐century presidents, ending with President Ronald Reagan.…”

“…Before the Civil War, vetoes were relatively rare events. Some scholars have noted that at this time, the veto was viewed as a narrow power and largely reserved for constitutional concerns (Latimer, 2017; Spitzer, 1988; Watson, 1993), while others note that the electoral motivations for veto politics had not yet emerged in this time (McCarty, 2009). After the Civil War, veto usage increased, with dramatic spikes associated with the noncontiguous administrations of Grover Cleveland in the late 1800s and the long presidency of Franklin Roosevelt starting in the 1930s.…”

“…We are far from the first to propose investigating the content of veto messages for the purposes of classifying messages or creating a typology of vetoes. For example, McCarty (2009) and Latimer (2017) both examine the constitutional versus policy orientation of early veto messages to demonstrate the mixture of early veto arguments. Other studies focus on veto messages from the modern presidency (Ringelstein, 1985; Watson, 1993).…”

“…Second, several studies point to changing veto norms and institutional development over time. In particular, some scholars have argued that norms kept early presidents from vetoing legislation on purely policy grounds (Latimer, 2017; Skowronek, 1993; Spitzer, 1988) while others have argued that emerging electoral politics led to purely policy‐based vetoes (McCarty, 2009). As such, we would expect a high proportion of constitutional concerns in the early republic and a decline of such arguments over time.…”