Veteran Politics in Restoration England, 1660–1670

Abstract

In 1660, whilst readily accepting the chance to reclaim the crown, Charles II and his supporters were aware of the risks. On 29 May, just hours before his triumphal procession into London, Charles received a discomforting reminder of the recent past when several regiments of the "Old Army" of the Commonwealth were drawn up for his inspection at Blackheath. This was the army which had engineered his father's execution, defeated Charles himself at Worcester, repressed his supporters in Britain and fought them in Flanders. Clarendon's published account gives the impression that 50,000 soldiers were present, whereas the actual figure was closer to three thousand. Nevertheless, the army as a whole probably did number around 50,000 men; a large proportion of whom were battlehardened troops. 1 The royal party left the heath in no doubt that the military capacity of the well-equipped, well-drilled Commonwealth regiments far outstripped their own. Other bodies of veterans merited equally sensitive handling: a petition presented to Parliament in 1659 on behalf of 6500 war pensioners had already indicated that huge numbers of maimed parliamentarian veterans and war widows would remain reliant on public charity after the Restoration. 2 The new regime had also to consider the attitudes of thousands of able-bodied veterans who had already returned to civilian life. There was a distinct chance that such men might foment disaffection among the wider population. Former soldiers were certainly suspected, for example, when newly erected royal arms began to be defaced in parish churches. 3 More worryingly, ex-parliamentarians were assumed (rightly, in some cases) to be stockpiling weapons and ammunition. Royalist veterans presented the Restoration authorities with further problems. Having been deprived of financial assistance during the Interregnum, thousands of impoverished and maimed royalist soldiers and widows expected to be rewarded for their loyalty. In placating any one body of veterans, therefore, the authorities risked arousing the resentment of others. Any misjudgement might reignite lingering antipathies and undermine the process of national reconciliation. Consequently, whilst the demobilisation of the army was vital for long-term political stability, it was but one element of a larger and more complex problem. It is often written that historians have devoted more attention to the experiences of parliamentarian soldiers during the civil wars and Interregnum than to their royalist counterparts. 4 The historiography of the Restoration is less straightforward. Considerable work has been done on radicals after 1660, most notably by Richard L. Greaves. 5 The deployment of military veterans overseas has attracted some attention, although relatively little has been published since the 1970s. 6 More surprisingly, the

¿Quién protege a los soldados? Representación colectiva y práctica de la protección en los ejércitos españoles de la edad moderna

“…13 La extrema politización del ejército parlamentario permitió que, tras la Restauración monárquica en 1660, las necesidades materiales de los veteranos y de sus familias fueran un tema político de primer orden en el Parlamento. Sobre los excombatientes realistas véase Stoyle (2003); sobre el esquema de pensiones y asistencia social de Carlos II de Inglaterra para los combatientes ex enemigos de la Monarquía, ver Appleby (2013). la protección religiosa-asistencial del monarca como máximo protector de sus soldados.…”

The third army: wandering soldiers and the negotiation of parliamentary authority, 1642–51

“…These bodies of men, however, would pose a different set of problems for a very different regime. 101 This study has sought to approach the complex problem of wandering soldiers from the varying perspectives of the men themselves, local civilian communities, and the parliamentary authorities in Westminster. With respect to the soldiers, it is wrong to assume that deserters, or even discharged veterans simply went home.…”