Vertical Information Sharing in Distribution Channels

Niraj, Rakesh; Narasimhan, Chakravarthi

doi:10.2139/ssrn.903988

Cited by 23 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Only three papers address this topic (Niraj and Narasimhan 2003, Subramanian et al 2010, Kurtuluş and Toktay 2011. Both Niraj and Narasimhan (2003) and Kurtuluş and Toktay (2011) investigate the emergence of CC. Both papers consider a model with two manufacturers selling to the consumers through a single retailer.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Both papers consider a model with two manufacturers selling to the consumers through a single retailer. Whereas Niraj and Narasimhan (2003) define CC as an exclusive information sharing alliance between the retailer and one of the manufacturers, Kurtuluş and Toktay (2011) define CC as an alliance that involves retail pricing in an environment with limited shelf space. Niraj and Narasimhan's findings are in terms of the complementarity of the information available to each party, whereas Kurtuluş the degree of product differentiation, the opportunity cost of shelf space, and the profit-sharing arrangement in the alliance.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Retail Assortment Planning Under Category Captainship

Kurtuluş

Nakkaş

2011

M&SOM

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Retail assortment planning can have a tremendous impact on a retailer's bottom-line performance. Over the past years, retailers have increasingly relied on their leading manufacturers for recommendations regarding the assortment to be offered to the consumers in a particular category, a practice often referred to as category captainship. Our research investigates the consequences of using category captains for assortment selection decisions. We develop a game-theoretic model where multiple manufacturers sell their products to consumers through a single retailer. We compare a model where the retailer selects the assortment in the category with a model where the retailer relies on a category captain for assortment decisions in return for a target category profit. We show that category captainship can, in some circumstances, benefit not only the retailer and the category captain, but also the noncaptain manufacturers. Our results have implications regarding the implementation of category captainship practices.retail supply chains, category management, category captainship, assortment planning, game theory

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Retail Assortment Planning Under Category Captainship

Kurtuluş

Nakkaş

2011

M&SOM

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“…From the firm's point of view, information sharing improves the precision of information available to itself and its rivals, which in turn leads to higher expected profits. Many firms have embarked on initiatives aimed at facilitating the sharing of information among themselves in order to improve information accuracy and pricing decisions [9,21,24,35]. For example, Sainsbury and Marks & Spencers in the U.K. and Super Valu store and Von's supermarket in the U.S. have created interorganizational systems for information exchange and sharing [24].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Many firms have embarked on initiatives aimed at facilitating the sharing of information among themselves in order to improve information accuracy and pricing decisions [9,21,24,35]. For example, Sainsbury and Marks & Spencers in the U.K. and Super Valu store and Von's supermarket in the U.S. have created interorganizational systems for information exchange and sharing [24]. American Airlines and United Airlines in the airline industry exchange their cost information in order to improve profitability [1].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive information sharing in various market structures

Yan

Pei

2015

Decision Support Systems

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“…5 One direct implication of SB introduction is that it makes the retailer a competitor of the manufacturer (Amrouche and Zaccour 2007). Consequently, SB introduction 4 More recent work on this domain investigate the incentives for chain partners to share demand and inventory information (Gal-Or et al 2008, Niraj and Narasimhan 2004, Zhao et al 2002, contract types that facilitate information sharing (Cachon and Lariviere 2001, Ha and Tong 2008, He et al 2008, Kong et al 2013, Thonemann 2002,Özer and Wei 2006, Yue and Liu 2006, and the role of trust in information sharing (Özer et al 2011, 2014) 5 Another stream of research less related to our work considers the supply chain efficiency and coordination problems in the face of SB introduction (Chen et al 2009, Fang et al 2011, Groznik and Heese 2010a, Kurata et al 2007, Sachon and Martınez-de Albéniz 2009, Xia and Gilbert 2007 as well as the impact of SB introduction in the context of competing retailers Heese 2010b, Liao andYano 2013).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Consumer Taste Uncertainty in the Context of Store Brand and National Brand Competition

2017

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. In this paper, we focus on the uncertainty in consumer taste and study how a retailer can benefit from acquiring that taste information in the presence of competition between the retailer's store brand and a manufacturer's national brand. In this context, we also identify the optimal information sharing strategy of the retailer with the manufacturer as well as the equilibrium product positioning and pricing of the two brands. We model a competitive setting in which there is ex-ante uncertainty about consumer preferences for different product features and the retailer has a distinct advantage in terms of resolving this uncertainty, given his close proximity to the consumers. We identify two important effects of retailer's information acquisition and sharing decisions about consumer taste. The direct effect is that having taste information allows the retailer to make better SB introduction and positioning decisions. The indirect effect is that information sharing enables the manufacturer to make better NB positioning decisions -which in return may benefit or hurt the retailer. Furthermore, we show that these effects interact with each other and the nature of their interaction depends on three external factors: relative popularity of different product features, the vertical differentiation between the two brands, and the cost of store brand introduction. This interaction is most striking when the store brand introduction is not very costly. In this case, if one of the features is quite popular, then the retailer voluntarily shares information with the manufacturer because the indirect effect augments the value of the direct effect -even though this increases the competition between the brands. Terms of use: Documents inOtherwise, the retailer refrains from information sharing because the indirect effect then diminishes the value of the direct effect. We also generate managerial insights as to when it is most valuable for the retailer to acquire taste information as well its worth for the manufacturer.

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Vertical Information Sharing in Distribution Channels

Cited by 23 publications

References 23 publications

Retail Assortment Planning Under Category Captainship

Retail Assortment Planning Under Category Captainship

Incentive information sharing in various market structures

Consumer Taste Uncertainty in the Context of Store Brand and National Brand Competition

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