Vers une prévention macro-prudentielle des crises financières internationales

Abstract

Macro-prudential prevention of international financial crises The new international financial structure tries to modernise emergent financial markers and to reinforce prevention and management's tools of international crises. Crises' prevention isn't restricted to macroeconomic supervision if speculative attacks correspond to financial runs and vulnerability of intenational financial structure : importance of foreign short term finance, concentration of international banking creditors, conversion of high termination date, high volatility of collateral, increasing correlation of asset prices on emergent markets... So prevention macro-prudential policies become interesting to introduce incentives or rules improving systemic risk management. JEL classification : E44, F33, G15

Persistence of currency crises: evidence to Asian and subprime crisis

“…The Thai crisis rapidly spread to other neighboring countries with similar growth through contagion. This crisis gives a character of the third generation (Artus, 2000;Cartapanis, 2003). In March 1997, the Thai baht fell.…”

Nouveau central banking et cycle international du crédit

“…Aujourd'hui, si l'objectif final de la politique monétaire semble devoir rester la stabilité des prix et de l'output, la stabilité financière ne peut plus être considérée comme une dimension négligeable de la stabilité macroéconomique et l'édification d'un cadre réglementaire macroprudentiel répond à ce défi. Le but est d'intégrer le risque systémique et la procyclicité de la finance dans les règles prudentielles qui s'imposent aux institutions financières (Cartapanis, 2003(Cartapanis, et 2011a. Tel est l'agenda du nouveau dispositif prudentiel international, communément dénommé Bâle III.…”

The link between international supervision and banking crises

“…However, other researchers conclude prudential regulation does not contribute to avoiding yet eliminating banking crises. In fact, André Icard (2002) and Andre Cartapanis (2003) show banking governance does not allow improvement of financial system security. Cartapanis (2003) observes banking governance cannot contain systemic risk, the ultimate risk for banks.…”

“…In fact, André Icard (2002) and Andre Cartapanis (2003) show banking governance does not allow improvement of financial system security. Cartapanis (2003) observes banking governance cannot contain systemic risk, the ultimate risk for banks. These authors explain that crises spread with spectacular speed from one economy to another through the financial and business exchanges between countries.…”

“…They conclude prudential regulation does not contribute to reducing and avoiding banking crises. Icard (2002) and Cartapanis (2003) show prudential regulation does not allow improvement of financial system security. They note banking governance contains a systemic risk, the most serious that can strike banking.…”