Verifying exchange rate regimes

Frankel, Jeffrey A.; Fajnzylber, Eduardo; Schmukler, Sergio L.; Servén, Luis

doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(01)00167-5

Cited by 70 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…These authors provide a thorough analysis of the potential drawbacks of each system. Currently, focus has been on the "disappearing middle", observing that more nations are choosing either hard-peg or floating rates (see Fisher, 2001 andFrankel et al, 2001). This tendency was also noted by Eichengreen (1994) and Summers (2000).…”

Section: Evaluations Of Currency Regimesmentioning

confidence: 76%

Currency regimes and currency crises: What about cocoa money?

LeClair

2007

Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Mo

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Section: Evaluations Of Currency Regimesmentioning

confidence: 76%

Currency regimes and currency crises: What about cocoa money?

LeClair

2007

Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Mo

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“…This began to be called hypothesis of the vanishing intermediate exchange rate regime, or "bipolar view" or "corner solutions" to the practical exchange rate arrangements. For example, Frankel, Fajnzylber, Schmukler and Serven (2001) 2001 Babula andOtker-Robe (2002) show that both hard pegs and floating regimes importance has increased. In 1990 hard pegs represented around 15% of exchange rate arrangements across the world, while in 2001 this has increased to little more than 25%.…”

Section: Empirical Methodologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Exchange Rate Policy Tensions: A Comparative Study between North Africa and Central & Eastern Europe

Massoud¹,

Horváth²

2015

AEF

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The performance of small open economies depends -to an extent -on the tension between government"s economic policy preferences and actual behavior. This tension can be nicely studied by analyzing the behavior of exchange rates, where one observes tensions between proclaimed de jure and de facto exchange rate policies. Typically a country makes a de jure commitment to a peg if it attempts to persuade markets of its strict monetary-policy priorities; similarly a country makes a de jure commitment to a float if it wants to keep monetary policy in its own hands. In this paper we measure the flexibility of exchange rate which partially helps in deciphering the de facto behavior. For this purpose, we use comparative data of two sets of countries: North African as well as Central and Eastern European.Keywords: Exchange rate policy, de facto exchange rate regimes, and exchange market pressure

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“…Under a fixed regime, there are no expected variations in exchange rates, and, therefore, there is no room to sustain autonomous monetary policy. This is what is known as macroeconomic Trilemma (Obstfeld and Taylor, 1998), the Impossible Trinity (Frankel et al, 2001) or the Trilogy (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004), terms all used to refer to the impossibility of simultaneously combining a fixed exchange rate, capital mobility and an activist monetary policy.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%