Verifying Different-Modality Properties for Concepts Produces Switching Costs

Abstract

According to perceptual symbol systems, sensorimotor simulations underlie the representation of concepts. It follows that sensorimotor phenomena should arise in conceptual processing. Previous studies have shown that switching from one modality to another during perceptual processing incurs a processing cost. If perceptual simulation underlies conceptual processing, then verifying the properties of concepts should exhibit a switching cost as well. For example, verifying a property in the auditory modality (e.g., BLENDER-loud) should be slower after verifying a property in a different modality (e.g., CRANBERRIES-tart) than after verifying a property in the same modality (e.g., LEAVES-rustling). Only words were presented to subjects, and there were no instructions to use imagery. Nevertheless, switching modalities incurred a cost, analogous to the cost of switching modalities in perception. A second experiment showed that this effect was not due to associative priming between properties in the same modality. These results support the hypothesis that perceptual simulation underlies conceptual processing.

Moving words: dynamic representations in language comprehension*

“…The findings reported in this article add to the growing body of evidence that language comprehension routinely involves the activation of perceptual representations (Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2003;Richardson et al, 2003;Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001;Zwaan et al, 2002;Zwaan & Yaxley, 2003a, 2003b. However, the current findings constitute an advance over this earlier research in several ways.…”

The spatial foundations of the conceptual system

“…To my knowledge, the original formulation by Barsalou (1999), which presented an extensive but necessarily schematic account has, aside from some experimental support for its existence (e.g. Pecher et al 2003), not been greatly amplified. At most, there have been attempts to locate simulation in modality-specific areas of the brain.…”

Putting words in perspective

“…For example, Pecher, Zeelenberg, and Barsalou (2003) asked people to verify that concepts had particular properties-for example, that a BLENDER is loud. The decision was facilitated when the previous verification trial tapped the same perceptual dimension (LEAVES-rustling) than when the previous trial tapped a different perceptual dimension (CRANBERRIES-tart).…”