Verifiable M+1st-Price Auction without Manager

Hsu, Po-Chu; Miyaji, Atsuko

doi:10.1109/dsc49826.2021.9346242

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…In addition to sealed-bid auction protocols providing small or simple deposit methods [1], [8], [9], [13], [15]- [19], [27]- [29], [31], [32], recently, David et al [10] proposed FAST (Fair Auctions via Secret Transactions) with the same motivation as ours. That is, the deposit reveals information about the bid, and thus it should be hidden.…”

Section: Concurrent and Independent Workmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…Another countermeasure involves, each bidder being required to send a deposit more than or equal to the bidding price. We call this method the "simple deposit method" and has been widely employed, e.g., [1], [8], [9], [15]- [18], [27]- [29], [31], [32]. However, even if the fund binding property is provided, the maximum bidding price can be revealed.…”

Section: B Previous Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Sealed-bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage

Chin¹,

Emura²,

Omote³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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In an open-bid auction, a bidder can know the budgets of other bidders. Thus, a sealed-bid auction that hides bidding prices is desirable. However, in previous sealed-bid auction protocols, it has been difficult to provide a "fund binding" property, which would guarantee that a bidder has funds more than or equal to the bidding price and that the funds are forcibly withdrawn when the bidder wins. Thus, such protocols are vulnerable to false bidding. As a solution, many protocols employ a simple deposit method in which each bidder sends a deposit to a smart contract, which is greater than or equal to the bidding price, before the bidding phase. However, this deposit reveals the maximum bidding price, and it is preferable to hide this information. In this paper, we propose a sealedbid auction protocol that provides a fund binding property. Our protocol not only hides the bidding price and a maximum bidding price, but also provides fund binding, simultaneously. For hiding the maximum bidding price, we pay attention to the fact that usual Ethereum transactions and transactions for sending funds to a one-time address have the same transaction structure, and it seems that they are indistinguishable. We discuss how much bidding transactions are hidden. We also employ DECO (Zhang et al,. CCS 2020) that proves the validity of the data to a verifier in which the data are taken from a source without showing the data itself. Finally, we give our implementation which shows transaction fees required and compare it to a sealed-bid auction protocol employing the simple deposit method.

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Section: Concurrent and Independent Workmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: B Previous Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Sealed-bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage

Chin¹,

Emura²,

Omote³

et al. 2022

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…is strategy can also be used in follow-up research studies [7][8][9]. In our preliminary version of [10], we construct a verifiable M + 1st-price auction without manager. In the journal version, we implement the smart contract and reduce the computation cost by using elliptic curve cryptography.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Publicly Verifiable M + 1st-Price Auction Fit for IoT with Minimum Storage

Hsu

Miyaji

2021

Security and Communication Networks

Self Cite

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In an M + 1 st-price auction, all bidders submit their bids simultaneously, and the M highest bidders purchase M identical goods at the M + 1 st bidding price. Previous research is constructed based on trusted managers such as a trusted third party (TTP), trusted mix servers, and honest managers. All of the previous auctions are not fit for edge-assisted IoT since they need TTP. In this paper, we formalize a notion of commutative bi-homomorphic multiparty encryption and achieve no-TTP M + 1 -st auction based on blockchain with public verifiability. Our M + 1 st auction guarantees financial fairness, robustness, and correctness without TTP and is secure under a malicious model for the first time. Our M + 1 st auction can be executed over a distributed network and is thus fit for edge-assisted IoT. Furthermore, our formalized commutative bi-homomorphic multiparty encryption can be used in various applications for edge-assisted IoT, which needs to protect privacy and correctness.

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Scalable M+1st-Price Auction with Infinite Bidding Price

Hsu

Miyaji

2022

Science of Cyber Security

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Verifiable M+1st-Price Auction without Manager

Cited by 6 publications

References 12 publications

A Sealed-bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage

A Sealed-bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage

Publicly Verifiable M + 1st-Price Auction Fit for IoT with Minimum Storage

Scalable M+1st-Price Auction with Infinite Bidding Price

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