VDM at Large: Modelling the EMV® $$2^{nd}$$2nd Generation Kernel

Freitas, Leo

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-03044-5_8

Cited by 3 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Specification languages. AADL (Architecture Analysis & Design Language) [18,73], ASF (Anonymous Secure Framework) [156], ASLan++ (AVANTSSAR Specification Language) [21], BAN logic [54,232], Boogie [34], Boxed Ambients [138], CASM (ASM-based SL for compilers) [257], CCS (Calculus of Communicating Systems) [155], COVERT (compositional analysis of Android apps) [29], CSP (Communicating Sequential Systems) [123], CSP# (shared variables CSP) [241], CTL (Computation tree temporal logic) [233], Cloud Calculus [138], Cryptol [92], Dynamic State Machine [189], ERC20 token contracts [203], Event-B [85], HLPSL (High Level Protocol Specification Language) [46], Hoare logic [111], LS2 (Logic of Secure Systems) [30], LTL (linear-time temporal logic) [271], Markov Decision Process [184], Petri nets [15], π -calculus [43], PlusCal [9], Promela [175], RTL (real-time logic) [113], SPDL (Security Protocol Description Language) [171], SysML-Sec [18], TLA+ (Temporal Logic of Actions) [75], Trusted CSP# [30], überSpark [257], VDM [101], Verilog [167], VHDL [114], VML [230], vTRUST [120], XMHF (eXtensible and Modular Hypervisor Framework)…”

Section: Specification Languages and Associated Toolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Survey of Practical Formal Methods for Security

et al. 2022

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In today’s world, critical infrastructure is often controlled by computing systems. This introduces new risks for cyber attacks, which can compromise the security and disrupt the functionality of these systems. It is therefore necessary to build such systems with strong guarantees of resiliency against cyber attacks. One way to achieve this level of assurance is using formal verification, which provides proofs of system compliance with desired cyber security properties. The use of Formal Methods (FM) in aspects of cyber security and safety-critical systems are reviewed in this article. We split FM into the three main classes: theorem proving, model checking and lightweight FM. To allow the different uses of FM to be compared, we define a common set of terms. We further develop categories based on the type of computing system FM are applied in. Solutions in each class and category are presented, discussed, compared and summarised. We describe historical highlights and developments and present a state-of-the-art review in the area of FM in cyber security. This review is presented from the point of view of FM practitioners and researchers, commenting on the trends in each of the classes and categories. This is achieved by considering all types of FM, several types of security and safety-critical systems and by structuring the taxonomy accordingly. The article hence provides a comprehensive overview of FM and techniques available to system designers of security-critical systems, simplifying the process of choosing the right tool for the task. The article concludes by summarising the discussion of the review, focusing on best practices, challenges, general future trends and directions of research within this field.

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Section: Specification Languages and Associated Toolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The authors of [101] have modelled 80% of EMV2, a successor to EMV, in VDM to provide a formal model for the implementation and analyse security attributes of EMV2. The authors have further attempted to code generate parts of EMV2 to Java directly from the VDM model.…”

Section: Acknowledgmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey of Practical Formal Methods for Security

et al. 2022

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“…Despite there being a standard (RFC 4180) 2 , there are many versions and variations 3 . Its long history of use 4 has inspired various other "simple" formats for data management and exchange, such as JSON [5], XML and various spreadsheet formats.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Here we present a VDM CSV library to capture aspects of the CSV data being imported to VDM, such that users can introduce specification to the CSV data as if it was a VDM data type. For system-architecture CSV files, tools like VDMJ's CSVReader or bespoke tools like those in [4,9,12] are suited; whereas for general data manipuation over varied CSV dialects and IO speed (e.g. log files, simulation runs, etc.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Related to formal CSV (and data sources) formal processing, we worked on generation of VDM files from XSD files describing the data dictionary of the EMV payment systems [4], and similar efforts have been applied to the Function Mockup Unit standard 8 . Another example is for loading the control system finite state machine definitions in CSV for a dialyser [9] and a brain pace maker [12].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Specification-based CSV Support in VDM

Freitas¹,

Buhagiar²

2023

Preprint

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CSV is a widely used format for data representing systems control, information exchange and processing, logging, etc. Nevertheless, the format is riddled with tricky corner cases and inconsistencies, which can make input data unreliable, thus, rendering modelling or simulation experiments unusable or unsafe. We address this problem by providing a SAFE-CSV VDM-library that is: Simple, Accurate, Fast, and Effective. It extends an ecosystem of other VDM mathematical toolkit extensions, which also includes a translation and proof environment for VDM in Isabelle.

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A Methodology for Protocol Verification Applied to EMV® 1

Freitas

Modesti

Emms

2018

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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The EMVCo 3 organisation (i.e. MasterCard, Visa, etc.) protocols facilitate worldwide interoperability of secure electronic payments. Despite recent advances, it has proved difficult for academia to provide an acceptable solution to construction of secure applications within industry's constraints. In this paper, we describe a methodology we have applied to EMV1. It involves domain specific languages and verification tools targeting different analysis of interest. We are currently collaborating with EMVCo on their upcoming EMV R 2 nd Generation (EMV2) specifications.

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VDM at Large: Modelling the EMV® $$2^{nd}$$2nd Generation Kernel

Cited by 3 publications

References 10 publications

A Survey of Practical Formal Methods for Security

A Survey of Practical Formal Methods for Security

Specification-based CSV Support in VDM

A Methodology for Protocol Verification Applied to EMV® 1

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