Varieties of Radicalism: Examining the Diversity of Radical Left Parties and Voters in Western Europe

Abstract

Radical left parties (RLPs) are a diverse lot and several RLP subtypes have been distinguished in the literature. However, the degree to which these subtypes are associated to significantly different policy proposals has not been analysed. At the same time, little is known about whether these predicated subtypes are associated to differences in their voters' characteristics. In this article, we analyse the policy positions of RLPs across a number of issues using manifesto and expert survey data, allowing us to assess the nature of the differentiation between types of RLPs. We find that RLPs differ in the extent to which they adopt New Politics issues, and we propose a classification of Traditional and New Left RLPs. Using cross-national survey data coming from the European Election Studies series and multilevel multinomial models, we also examine the ideological, policy and social differences in the electorates of the various types of RLPs. We find socio-demographic and attitudinal differences between the voters of Traditional and New Left RLPs that are consistent with the programmatic differences of the parties.

Radical-Left Populism during the Great Recession: Podemos and Its Competition with the Established Radical Left

“…This enriches the literature on contemporary radical-left voters (Gómez et al, 2016;Ramiro, 2016) showing the distinct social basis for the growth of radical-left populism: less ideologically radicalised groups, hit by the crisis and dissatisfied with mainstream politics.…”

Positional deprivation and support for radical right and radical left parties*

“…In the extensive literature clarifying radical right and left populism, economic fortune and misfortune have received plenty of attention, and revealed to be major factors undergirding radical populism. For instance, individual economic insecurities grounded in socio-economic class, unemployment and, particularly, low income are major predictors of voting radical right (see Lubbers et al, 2002;Werts et al, 2013;Rydgren, 2013;Oesch and Rennwald 2018) and radical left (see Gomez et al 2016;Sperber 2010;Ramiro 2016;. There is also some evidence that exposure to globalization and trade spur electoral support for radical-left and, particularly, radical-right parties (Betz 1994;Swank and Betz 2003;Kriesi et al 2008;Autor et al 2016;Calantone and Stanig 2018).…”

“…Betz 1994;Kriesi et al 2008;Colantone and Stanig 2017;Autor et.al. 2016;Rydgren and Ruth 2013;Gomez et al 2016;Sperber 2010;Ramiro 2016). These conditions, however, do not directly touch-upon the resentments that qualitative reporting has found to prevail among political supporters of radical parties: a feeling of 'losing-out' compared to one's own past and compared to other groups in society.…”

Do Changes in Material Circumstances Drive Support for Populist Radical Parties? Panel Data Evidence from the Netherlands during the Great Recession, 2007–2015

“…People who are experiencing economic hardship may turn to radical left-wing parties, for these parties most vocally champion welfare spending and blame other political actors, including the centre-left, for ignoring the needs of economically marginalized voters (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014;Gomez, Morales and Ramiro, 2016). Indeed, there is evidence that economic hardship is followed by increased support for redistribution (Margalit, 2013;Owens and Pedulla, 2014;Emmenegger, Marx and Schraff, 2015;Naumann, Buss and Bä hr, 2016) and that support for the radical left is concentrated among low-income voters who are strongly supportive of redistribution (Visser et al, 2014).…”