Varieties of Populism across a Left‐Right Spectrum: The Case of the Front National, the Northern League, Podemos and Five Star Movement

Ivaldi, Gilles; Lanzone, Maria Elisabetta; Woods, Dwayne

doi:10.1111/spsr.12278

Cited by 154 publications

(92 citation statements)

References 36 publications

(45 reference statements)

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“…As Ivaldi et al. () show, the Lega under Salvini has returned to a clear nativist profile: the party calls to stop the ‘invasion’ of migrants and advocates priority to nationals ( prima i nostri ) in welfare and jobs. It has endorsed economic nativism, strongly opposing financial interests and large corporations, while simultaneously rejecting the EU and free trade agreements such as Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.…”

Section: Economic Nativismmentioning

confidence: 99%

It's not Economic Interventionism, Stupid! Reassessing the Political Economy of Radical Right‐wing Populist Parties

Otjes

Ivaldi

Jupskås

et al. 2018

Swiss Political Sci Review

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This paper engages in a comparative analysis of the economic positions of radical rightwing populist parties in Western Europe. Following Ennser-Jedenastik (2016), we argue that those parties' political economy is best captured in terms of the nativist, populist and authoritarian features of their core ideology, each of which produces a specific set of economic policies independent from the issue of government intervention in the economy. On basis of an analysis of the election manifestos of seven radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe in the period 2005-2015, we argue that those parties share similarities in their economic nativism, authoritarianism and populism, whilst their positions on the traditional role of the state in the economy are more diverse. The findings indicate also a unified 'nativist' response to the global financial crisis both in terms of welfare chauvinism and economic protectionism. We discuss the role of internal and external factors in explaining the economic profile of radical right-wing populist parties.

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Section: Economic Nativismmentioning

confidence: 99%

It's not Economic Interventionism, Stupid! Reassessing the Political Economy of Radical Right‐wing Populist Parties

Otjes

Ivaldi

Jupskås

et al. 2018

Swiss Political Sci Review

Self Cite

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“…Populist parties both left and right increasingly converge on a common protectionist agenda. They oppose European integration and economic globalization, while operating on patriotism and the defense of national interests (Ivaldi et al 2017). In the French context, both LFI and the FN show strong opposition to economic globalization and neoliberal capitalism.…”

Section: Populists Against the Eumentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The party relies on a small grassroots base of about 50,000 members. In addition, the FN has been undergoing a process of 'marinization' whereby Marine Le Pen has successfully replaced her father as charismatic leader, both inside and outside the party (Ivaldi and Lanzone 2016). Externally, the founding in 2012 of the Marine Blue Rally (Rassemblement Bleu Marine, RBM) attested to the persistence of the FN's model of personalistic leadership dominated by Le Pen herself.…”

Section: The Populist Agency: Organizational Basismentioning

confidence: 99%

Populism in France

Ivaldi

2018

Populism Around the World

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This chapter examines the supply and demand sides of populism in France. It looks at the two main populist actors i.e. the Front National (FN) and La France Insoumise (LFI). The FN exemplifies the typical radical right populist organization, primarily mobilizing grievances over immigration, while LFI shows a left-wing egalitarian and socially inclusive profile. Electoral support for populism in France is fuelled by economic instability and voter distrust of mainstream politics and of the EU. Both LFI and the FN increasingly converge on a common protectionist platform, opposing the EU and globalization. Populist voting in 2017 is found predominantly amongst the youngest cohorts and it is strongly correlated with populist attitudes. FN voters are primarily found amongst the so-called 'losers' of globalization in the lower social classes, who are typically more anti-immigrant and more authoritarian. LFI attracts on the other hand a broader coalition of secularized voters in the middle and lower social classes, who are primarily motivated by economic concerns. Both FN and LFI voters are more Eurosceptic than the mainstream, and they share similar concerns about globalization.

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“…2 Discursive exclusion and inclusion 'essentially alludes to setting the boundaries of 'the people' and, ex negativo, 'the elite' (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013: 164, emphasis in original). While all populists vertically separate a 'people' from an 'elite', exclusionary and inclusionary populists take different approaches to horizontally differentiating among the population in order to define 'the (morally true) people' and their antagonists (Ivaldi, Lanzone and Woods 2017;March 2017). Exclusionary populists advance a discourse of horizontal exclusion which restricts 'the people' to a national, ethnic or otherwise defined sub-group of the population, and casts others as outsiders to this 'true' people (De Cleen and Stavrakakis 2017).…”

Section: Varieties Of Populist Contestation: Exclusion Vs Inclusion mentioning

confidence: 99%

Varieties of populism and the challenges to Global Constitutionalism: Dangers, promises and implications

Koch

2020

Glob. Con.

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This article analyses the rise of populism and its discursive challenge to global constitutionalism (GC). It shows that populist contestation is more ambivalent than often suggested: its challenge depends on the populist variety and can both undermine or support liberal principles of GC. Building on the ideational approach to populism and a framework of transnational politicisation, a proposed typology identifies both communitarian types of populism and cosmopolitan types of populism. Illustrative case studies of the Alternative for Germany, the Polish Law and Justice Party, the Democracy in Europe Movement and Peru’s Alberto Fujimori substantiate these empirically. While all cases contest a perceived lack of popular sovereignty in a largely non-majoritarian global constitutional order, varieties of populism present contrasting responses: communitarian types push for global de-constitutionalisation in line with illiberal nationalist majoritarianism, while cosmopolitan types support global constitutionalisation according to liberal and democratic principles. Further, neo-socialist populists campaign against neoliberal principles in GC, but remain divided about supporting political principles beyond the state. These findings suggest an emerging politicisation of the process of global constitutionalisation at the societal level according to principles of democratic legitimacy; and global constitutional differentiation depending on outcomes of these normatively ambivalent and empirically contingent political contests.

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Varieties of Populism across a Left‐Right Spectrum: The Case of the Front National, the Northern League, Podemos and Five Star Movement

Cited by 154 publications

References 36 publications

It's not Economic Interventionism, Stupid! Reassessing the Political Economy of Radical Right‐wing Populist Parties

It's not Economic Interventionism, Stupid! Reassessing the Political Economy of Radical Right‐wing Populist Parties

Populism in France

Varieties of populism and the challenges to Global Constitutionalism: Dangers, promises and implications

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