Varieties of ontological dependence

Koslicki, Kathrin

doi:10.1017/cbo9781139149136.008

Cited by 180 publications

(71 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…There are hyperintensional contexts that are not in any way 'about representational features' (see Nolan [31]), and counterfactuals may well be among these. Hyperintensionality without appeal to representation is invoked in many discussions of metaphysical grounding; see for example papers in Correia and Schnieder [11], like Fine [13] and Koslicki [19]. On connections between grounding and counterfactuals, see Krakauer [40] and Schaffer [20].…”

Section: Substitution Of Identicalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Finally, appeal to our knowledge that no number is both prime and composite to conclude that there is no largest prime. 19 Again, the final step of this reasoning is unproblematic for vacuists and nonvacuists alike; the alleged trouble for the nonvacuist is in getting (56)…”

Section: Reductio Argumentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…22 This contextual variation is effected in different ways in different formalisms. In the semantics of Section 2.3, it is linked to the R A relations; different contexts will 19 This is not the usual proof that there is no largest prime. (This shows that for any prime, p, there must be a larger.…”

Section: Reductio Argumentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Williamson on Counterpossibles

et al. 2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Section: Substitution Of Identicalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Reductio Argumentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Williamson on Counterpossibles

et al. 2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In particular, although some varieties of ontological dependence can be explicated in modal or existential terms, these are not sufficiently fine-grained in all cases, especially if we hope to make sense of Aristotelian priority. As Koslicki (2012b) observes, Aristotle's conception of dependence, at least in the Categories, is often described in modal and existential terms, i.e. all things necessarily depend for their existence on the existence of primary substances.…”

Section: Fundamentality Grounding Ontological Dependence and Essencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, Peramatzis (2011, 203 ff.) also argues that a non-existential reading of Aristotelian ontological priority is more plausible, and Koslicki (2012b) abandons the existential reading at the outset. Peramatzis further points out that the modal formulation of Aristotelian ontological priority can be grounded in the non-modal, essentialist characterisation, i.e.…”

Section: Fundamentality Grounding Ontological Dependence and Essencementioning

confidence: 99%

Metaphysics as the First Philosophy

Tahko¹

Aristotle on Method and Metaphysics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

On the Mathematical Constitution and Explanation of Physical Facts

Berkovitz

2020

Jerusalem Studies in Philosophy and History of Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The mathematical nature of modern physics suggests that mathematics is bound to play some role in explaining physical reality. Yet, there is an ongoing controversy about the prospects of mathematical explanations of physical facts and their nature. A common view has it that mathematics provides a rich and indispensable language for representing physical reality but that, ontologically, physical facts are not mathematical and, accordingly, mathematical facts cannot really explain physical facts. In what follows, I challenge this common view. I argue that, in addition to its representational role, in modern physics mathematics is constitutive of the physical. Granted the mathematical constitution of the physical, I propose an account of explanation in which mathematical frameworks, structures, and facts explain physical facts. In this account, mathematical explanations of physical facts are either species of physical explanations of physical facts in which the mathematical constitution of some physical facts in the explanans are highlighted, or simply explanations in which the mathematical constitution of physical facts are highlighted. In highlighting the mathematical constitution of physical facts, mathematical explanations of physical facts deepen and increase the scope of the understanding of the explained physical facts. I argue that, unlike other accounts of mathematical explanations of physical facts, the proposed account is not subject to the objection that mathematics only represents the physical facts that actually do the explanation. I conclude by briefly considering the implications that the mathematical constitution of the physical has for the question of the unreasonable effectiveness of the use of mathematics in physics. Outline 1 The orthodoxy 2 An alternative perspective 3 On the relationship between mathematics and physics 4 On conceptions of mathematical constitution of the physical 5 On the common view of how mathematical models represent physical reality 6 On the notion of the physical 7 On the scope of the mathematical constitution of the physical 8 A sketch of a new account of mathematical explanation of physical facts 9 On mathematical explanations of physical facts 9.1 On a D-N explanation of the life cycle of 'periodical' cicadas 9.2 On structural explanation of the uncertainty relations 9.3 On abstract explanation of the impossibility of a minimal tour across the bridges of Königsberg 9.4 On explanations by constraints that are more necessary than laws of nature 10 Is the effectiveness of mathematics in physics unreasonable?

show abstract

Varieties of ontological dependence

Cited by 180 publications

References 0 publications

Williamson on Counterpossibles

Williamson on Counterpossibles

Metaphysics as the First Philosophy

On the Mathematical Constitution and Explanation of Physical Facts

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About