Varieties of Lucid Dreaming Experience

LaBerge, Stephen; DeGracia, Donald J.

doi:10.1075/aicr.20.14lab

Cited by 61 publications

(69 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…We have reason to suspect that non-lucid dream reports are more prone to narrative fabrication than lucid reports. This, as I discuss in more detail in the following section, is because cognitive abilities such as memory and rational capacity are better retained in lucid dreams (Kahan and LaBerge, 1994; LaBerge, 2000; LaBerge and DeGracia, 2000). This would explain why research of lucid dreams has consistently been able to correlate eye movements and muscle twitches (Schatzman et al, 1988), because lucid dream reports are generally more accurate than non-lucid reports.…”

Section: Narrative Fabrication In Dream Reportsmentioning

confidence: 98%

See 1 more Smart Citation

What I make up when I wake up: anti-experience views and narrative fabrication of dreams

Rosen

2013

Front. Psychol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

I propose a narrative fabrication thesis of dream reports, according to which dream reports are often not accurate representations of experiences that occur during sleep. I begin with an overview of anti-experience theses of Norman Malcolm and Daniel Dennett who reject the received view of dreams, that dreams are experiences we have during sleep which are reported upon waking. Although rejection of the first claim of the received view, that dreams are experiences that occur during sleep, is implausible, I evaluate in more detail the second assumption of the received view, that dream reports are generally accurate. I then propose a “narrative fabrication” view of dreams as an alternative to the received view. Dream reports are often confabulated or fabricated because of poor memory, bizarre dream content, and cognitive deficits. It is well documented that narratives can be altered between initial rapid eye movement sleep awakenings and subsequent reports. I argue that we have reason to suspect that initial reports are prone to inaccuracy. Experiments demonstrate that subjects rationalize strange elements in narratives, leaving out supernatural or bizarre components when reporting waking memories of stories. Inaccuracies in dream reports are exacerbated by rapid memory loss and bizarre dream content. Waking memory is a process of reconstruction and blending of elements, but unlike waking memory, we cannot reality-test for dream memories. Dream experiences involve imaginative elements, and dream content cannot be verified with external evidence. Some dreams may involve wake-like higher cognitive functions, such as lucid dreams. Such dreams are more likely to elicit accurate reports than cognitively deficient dreams. However, dream reports are generally less accurate than waking reports. I then propose methods which could verify the narrative fabrication view, and argue that although the theory cannot be tested with current methods, new techniques and technologies may be able to do so in the future.

show abstract

Section: Narrative Fabrication In Dream Reportsmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…See Kahan and LaBerge (1994); LaBerge (2000); LaBerge and DeGracia (2000); LaBerge and Levitan (2004); Spadafora and Hunt (1990). For discussion, see Windt and Metzinger (2007).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

What I make up when I wake up: anti-experience views and narrative fabrication of dreams

Rosen

2013

Front. Psychol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Yet, there was still a sense of duration and temporal, though not narrative, progression (Noreika; personal communication). An even more reduced form of the dream self are those cases in which dreamers report having been present as a disembodied entity or even "selfless" dreams, in which they experienced themselves as a disembodied point or freely moving center of awareness (Occhionero et al 2005;LaBerge and DeGracia 2000). 5 5 Of course, reports from such a selfless state would involve a performative contradiction; see Metzinger 2003: 539.…”

Section: Evidence From Empirical Dream Researchmentioning

confidence: 97%

The immersive spatiotemporal hallucination model of dreaming

Windt

2010

Phenom Cogn Sci

105

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The paper proposes a minimal definition of dreaming in terms of immersive spatiotemporal hallucination (ISTH) occurring in sleep or during sleepwake transitions and under the assumption of reportability. I take these conditions to be both necessary and sufficient for dreaming to arise. While empirical research results may, in the future, allow for an extension of the concept of dreaming beyond sleep and possibly even independently of reportability, ISTH is part of any possible extension of this definition and thus is a constitutive condition of dreaming. I also argue that the proposed ISTH model of dreaming, in conjunction with considerations on the epistemic relationship between dreaming and dream reports, raises important questions about the extent to which dreams typically involve a detailed body representation-an assumption that plays an important role in philosophical work on dreaming. As a commonly accepted definition of dreaming is lacking in current dream research, the ISTH model, which integrates conceptual analysis and epistemological considerations with results from empirical research, is an important contribution to this field. By linking dreaming to felt presence, full-body illusions, and autoscopic phenomena such as out-of-body experiences in wakefulness and in the hypnagogic state, the ISTH model of dreaming also helps integrate dream research, both theoretically and experimentally, with the study of other altered states of consciousness involving hallucinations. It makes straightforward and investigable predictions by claiming that all of these experiences have amodal spatiotemporal hallucinations as their common denominator. Finally, it is theoretically relevant for the philosophical discussion on minimal phenomenal selfhood.

show abstract

“…This vacuum is poised with ambiguity on the verge of what could or might be there, which by degree of immersion will be perceived as really there. LaBerge and DeGracia (2000) propose that global transient contexts and the cooperation and the competition among them frame the dreaming experience, and this idea is not so conceptually far from the possibilistic notion of competing possibilities of what could be there operating at the background of any perceptual environment, poised ready to become part of the scenery as ''about-to-be-seen.'' For instance, the dreamer watches a dark doorway looking to see if something is there, and not surprisingly, a figure appears not much later, or, the dreamer imagines flying up from the ground and soon after finds her/himself shooting up in the sky.…”

Section: Dreaming and Altered States Of Consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…The importance of context for explaining this phenomenon is that the particular context affords a continuity with accessible memory so that the person while still dreaming is able to retrieve memories from the waking self unrelated to the activities being performed in the dream. Such a Ôlucid dreaming contextÕ consists of (LaBerge & DeGracia, 2000): (1) a reference to state (a meta-cognitive awareness that one is dreaming) (2); a semantic framework (a framework of knowledge to conceptualize and give meaning to the experiences); and (3) a goal-options context (a range of behaviors expressed in the dream). In phenomenological terms, this context allows the waking self to position itself in relation to events in the dream resulting in the formation of a functional waking self-dream world unit that would otherwise not be feasible.…”

Section: Dreaming and Altered States Of Consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%