Varieties of Hermeneutical Injustice 1

Medina, José

doi:10.4324/9781315212043-4

Cited by 109 publications

(64 citation statements)

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“…Bear in mind that this form of injustice refers to cases where the experiences of some social groups in a collective are not reflected in and through interpretive schemes of that collective, for those social groups do not contribute to the collective's hermeneutical resources (Fricker, 2007;Medina, 2012). Medina (2017) even goes so far as to refer to hermeneutical death.…”

Section: Hermeneutical Injusticementioning

confidence: 99%

The Democratisation Myth

Knöchelmann

2021

S&TS

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Open access (OA) in the Global North is considered to solve an accessibility problem in scholarly communication. But this accessibility is restricted to the consumption of knowledge. Epistemic injustices inhering in the scholarly communication of a global production of knowledge remain unchanged. This underscores that the commercial or big deal OA dominating Europe and North America have little revolutionary potential to democratise knowledge. Academia in the Global North, driven by politics of progressive neoliberalism, can even reinforce its hegemonic power by solidifying and legitimating contemporary hierarchies of scholarly communication through OA. In a critique of the notion of a democratisation of knowledge, I showcase manifestations of OA as either allowing consumption of existing discourse or as active participation of discourse in the making. The latter comes closer to being the basis for a democratisation of knowledge. I discuss this as I issue a threefold conceptualisation of epistemic injustices comprising of testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice, and epistemic objectification. As these injustices prevail, the notion of a democratisation of knowledge through OA is but another form of technological determinism that neglects the intricacies of culture and hegemony.

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Section: Hermeneutical Injusticementioning

confidence: 99%

The Democratisation Myth

Knöchelmann

2021

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“…This is because the reasons behind the more generalized versions of a right to know discussed in the previous section cannot be satisfied by mere access to information in the absence of the epistemic capacities to utilize the information. In terms of epistemic justice, to fail to do so is to perpetrate a hermeneutical injustice by not giving citizens the tools necessary to understand the society in which they find themselves (Fricker ; Medina ).…”

Section: A Right To Understandmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The emerging discourse and policies around a right to know are important and likely to have significant impact on international institutions, states, societies, and individuals. Because this is a right of people and society to know the truth, it has an epistemic justice component, though the epistemic aspects of this right have thus far been underexamined in the literature (For discussion of what is meant by “epistemic justice” in this context, see e.g., Fricker ; Dotson ; Medina ; Pohlhaus ). Given the importance of the discourse, it is worth bringing the resources of social epistemology to bear on what a right to know would truly require.…”

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confidence: 99%

A Right to Understand Injustice: Epistemology and the “Right to the Truth” in International Human Rights Discourse

Werkheiser¹

2020

The Southern J of Philosophy

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People's “right to truth” or their “right to know” about their government's human rights abuses is a growing consensus in human rights discourses and a fertile area of work in international and humanitarian law. In most discussions of this right to know the truth, it is commonly seen as requiring the state or international institutions to provide access to evidence of the violations. In this paper, I argue that such a right naturally has many epistemic aspects, and the tools of social epistemology can be helpful in elucidating what such a right entails. As a beginning for this project, I draw on those resources to argue that the right to know the truth is only meaningful if it includes a right to understand the abuses, and that such understanding can only come through the development of community epistemic capacities. Given this, I further argue that the state has a duty to support the development of these capacities, and that a critical place for beginning this process is in public schools.

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“…It follows from this that an unmarried woman who was subjected to what we would call “rape” would have had a difficult time in describing her experience (at least when compared to someone who has access to the word ‘rape’ in her language and where “rape” is a relatively salient concept in her culture) and in asserting her interests since there existed no word by means of which she could identify her experience. This would be an example of a semantically produced case of hermeneutical injustice (Medina, 2017, p. 45), i.e., a social experience (for surely “rape” existed as a phenomenon in ancient Egyptian society) with no adequate label for it 45…”

Section: The Utility Of the Concept Of Internal Critique For The Studmentioning

confidence: 99%

Using the Concepts of Hermeneutical Injustice and Ideology to Explain the Stability of Ancient Egypt During the Middle Kingdom

Nabolsy¹

2020

J Historical Sociology

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This paper argues that the relative stability of ancient Egyptian society during the Middle Kingdom (c.2055-1650 BC) can in part be explained by referring to the phenomenon of hermeneutical injustice, i.e., the manner in which imbalances in socioeconomic power are causally correlated with imbalances in the conceptual scheme through which people attempt to interpret their social reality and assert their interests in light of their interpretations. The court literature of the Middle Kingdom is analyzed using the concepts of hermeneutical injustice and ideology. It is argued that while it is true that there was room for maneuver and for internal critique, the efficacy of internal critique was hindered by the structure of the intellectual discourse of Middle Kingdom Egypt. This intellectual discourse was suitable for the interpretation of social reality in a way that allowed the elites to assert their interests, but it was not suitable for the interpretation of social reality in a way that accorded with the interests of the exploited peasantry. 1 | INTRODUCTION One of the factors that can contribute to explaining the relative stability of ancient Egyptian society during the Middle Kingdom is the manner in which the conceptual tools that were available for the interpretation of social reality in ancient Egyptian society during the Middle Kingdom were structurally biased in a way that accorded with the interests of the ruling elite. While the focus of this paper is on the ideational factors which can contribute to explaining the relative stability of ancient Egyptian society during the Middle Kingdom, one should not deny that there are other factors that can be invoked to explain this relative stability. Geographical factors such as the "caging effect" that the Nile basin had on the population (Manning, 2013), and the relative security afforded by the deserts in the east and the west of the Nile basin (Hill, Jones, & Morales, 2013, p. 16

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Varieties of Hermeneutical Injustice 1

Cited by 109 publications

References 1 publication

The Democratisation Myth

The Democratisation Myth

A Right to Understand Injustice: Epistemology and the “Right to the Truth” in International Human Rights Discourse

Using the Concepts of Hermeneutical Injustice and Ideology to Explain the Stability of Ancient Egypt During the Middle Kingdom

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