Varieties of Carbon Governance in Newly Industrializing Countries

Fuhr, Harald; Lederer, Markus

doi:10.1177/1070496509347079

Cited by 48 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…There are, however, also some studies of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) (Rabe 2004, Selin and VanDeveer 2011, New Zealand (Hood 2010, see also Bullock 2012, the UK pilot emissions trading scheme (Nye and Owens 2008) and the Voluntary Carbon Market (VCM, see Bumpus and Liverman 2008). Furthermore, some broad comparative articles explore the patterns of policy development across different markets (see in particular Betsill andHoffmann 2011 andPaterson 2012), while others explore the CDM in the context of a 'varieties of capitalism' argument 4 about how this shapes national CDM governance systems (Friberg 2009, Fuhr and Lederer 2009, Schroeder 2009). …”

Section: Situating the Special Issuementioning

confidence: 99%

The politics of carbon markets: an introduction

Stephan

Paterson

2012

Environmental Politics

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This overview of the existing political analysis of carbon markets identifies three broad strands in the literature. The first is concerned with the processes by which particular carbon market schemes are established. The second focuses on the role of particular actors in the creation of carbon markets. The third strand assesses carbon markets on efficiency, legitimacy or justice grounds. This existing literature is contrasted with the framework developed by the contributions to this volume. Broadly drawing on constructivist and poststructuralist approaches, the carbon economy is deconstructed, its history scrutinised and the practices and technologies that have been used to bring these markets into being are highlighted. Thus it is demonstrated that politics is not limited to the policy process leading up to the decision to implement an emissions trading scheme or offset mechanism, but is also present in the forms of knowledge claims that underpin these markets, as well as the various daily practices that constitute them.

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Section: Situating the Special Issuementioning

confidence: 99%

The politics of carbon markets: an introduction

Stephan

Paterson

2012

Environmental Politics

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“…In regard to the CDM, the revenue from the CERs generated by the mechanism are within state interests because they are considered to be a national resource that is created at the local level (Benecke, 2009 In contrast to the Chinese government's efforts to direct CDM investment to specific areas that are in line with national priorities (Popp, 2011), the Indian government has adopted a laissezfaire approach to the CDM. In other words, the Indian government takes on a passive role of market facilitation when it comes to the the CDM (Benecke, 2009;Fuhr and Lederer, 2009;Newell, 2009). Specifically, the government refrains from setting up extensive regulation and does not proactively intervene in the promotion of carbon markets in India.…”

Section: Indian Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Laissez faire and the Clean Development Mechanism: determinants of project implementation in Indian states, 2003–2011

Bayer

Urpelainen

2014

Clean Techn Environ Policy

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India is the world's second-largest host of projects implemented under the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). There is, however, considerable variation in the distribution of CDM projects implemented across different Indian states. While a large body of literature examines cross-national variation in the implementation of CDM projects, few studies have analyzed the determinants of sub-national variation in different national contexts. Since India has adopted a laissez-faire approach to CDM project implementation, we theorize that profitable climate mitigation opportunities and political stability are two factors that promote CDM project implementation. A quantitative analysis provides empirical support for a set of hypotheses regarding the effects of these variables on project implementation. First, states with a lot of public electricity generating capacity and industrial capital implement more CDM projects than other states. Additionally, project developers rarely propose CDM projects during election years due to high levels of political uncertainty. Since India's liberal approach prevents the central government from using the CDM to promote sustainable development in less developed states, both India and other host countries should develop coordinated national policies to maximize their gains from CDM projects.Keywords: climate policy; international institutions; Clean Development Mechanism; India; sub-national variation. * This paper was written during a research stay funded by an ERP fellowship of the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes. Patrick Bayer gratefully acknowledges this generous funding and is thankful for the hospitality of Columbia University. We thank Michaël Aklin, S.P. Harish, and the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on a previous draft.

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“…Essentially, the allocation of CDM projects and the diffusion of technology is entirely left to the market dynamics (Benecke, 2009;Fuhr and Lederer, 2009;Newell, 2009). The Indian government neither restricts nor promotes the development of the CDM carbon market in different regions.…”

Section: Expectations For Indiamentioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining differences in sub-national patterns of clean technology transfer to China and India

Bayer

Urpelainen

2014

Int Environ Agreements

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The Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is capable of incentivizing the international transfer of environmentally sound technologies. Given that both countries are expected to have similar incentives when managing the distribution of technology transfer within the country, why does the sub-national patterns in allocation of projects with technology transfer differ across the two countries? Using comparable political-economic data compiled for China and India, we offer an explanation for these differences. In China, where the government regards the CDM as a tool for achieving sustainable development, technology transfer is concentrated in provinces that need it the most and are most conducive to receiving transfers (i.e., economically less developed, yet heavily industrialized provinces). In India, where the government takes on a "laissez faire" approach to the CDM, neither level of economic development nor that of industrialization affects clean technology transfer. In this regard, although the incentives are similar, the capacity to pursue them are not comparable. We test these hypotheses using data on CDM technology transfer across Chinese provinces and Indian states during a six-year period from 2004 to 2010.

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Varieties of Carbon Governance in Newly Industrializing Countries

Cited by 48 publications

References 29 publications

The politics of carbon markets: an introduction

The politics of carbon markets: an introduction

Laissez faire and the Clean Development Mechanism: determinants of project implementation in Indian states, 2003–2011

Explaining differences in sub-national patterns of clean technology transfer to China and India

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