Variation between Self- and Mutual Assessment in Animal Contests

Abstract

Limited resources lead animals into conflicts of interest, which are resolved when an individual withdraws from a direct contest. Current theory suggests that the decision to withdraw can be based on a threshold derived from an individual's own state (selfassessment) or on a comparison between their own state and their opponent's (mutual assessment). The observed variation between these assessment strategies in nature does not conform to theory. Thus, we require theoretical developments that explain the functional significance of different assessment strategies. We consider a hawkdove game with two discrete classes that differ in fighting ability, in which the players strategically decide on their investment toward mutual assessment. Analysis of the model indicates that there are simultaneous trade-offs relating to assessment strategies. First, weak individuals in a population must decide on whether to acquire information about their opponents at the cost of providing opponents with information about themselves. Secondly, all individuals must decide between investing in mutual assessment and being persistent in contests. Our analysis suggests that the potential for individuals to make errors during contests and differences in the consequences of sharing information within a population may serve as fundamental concepts for explaining variation in assessment strategy.

Aggressiveness as a component of fighting ability in pigs using a game-theoretical framework

“…Briffa & Elwood, 2005;Glass & Huntingford, 1988;Kelly & Godin, 2001). Selection should therefore favour individuals that make appropriate decisions based on assessment of the costs and benefits of fighting (Maynard Smith & Parker, 1976;Parker, 1974;Parker & Rubenstein, 1981), although such assessment does not always occur (Elwood & Arnott, 2012;Mesterton-Gibbons & Heap, 2014). There are two classes of theoretical models of animal contests that differ in their assumptions about the information-gathering abilities of contestants (reviewed by Arnott & Elwood, 2009a;Elwood & Arnott, 2012).…”

The evolution of respect for property

“…Recently, Mesterton‐Gibbons et al. () explored the role of mistakes in property games by introducing ownership uncertainty into both a one‐shot and an iterated Hawk–Dove game. They showed that if intruders sometimes believe themselves to be owners, then the resulting confusion over ownership can not only increase the frequency of fighting in the one‐shot game – consistent with the higher‐intensity fights between individuals observed in P. aegeria ‘when both males "believe" themselves to be owners of the sunspot in which the interaction occurs’ (Wickman & Wiklund, , p. 1208) – but also broaden the range of conditions under which Bourgeois behaviour is evolutionarily stable.…”

Contest Duration and Dynamics are Affected by Body Size in a Potentially Subsocial Crayfish (Crustacea: Decapoda)

“…animal contests, and there is a considerable number of cases where animals seem to use a mixed assessment strategy (Mesterton-Gibbons & Heap 2014;Palaoro et al 2014;Guillermo-Ferreira et al 2015). The aforementioned evidence of chemical communication was gathered from open-water freely living species rather than burrowing crayfish.…”