Variables and Attitudes

Abstract

The phenomenon of quantification into attitude ascriptions has haunted broadly Fregean views, according to which co-referential proper names are not always substitutable salva veritate in attitude ascriptions. Opponents of Fregeanism argue that a belief ascription containing a proper name such as 'Michael believes that Lindsay is charitable' is equivalent to a quantified sentence such as 'there is someone such that Michael believes that she is charitable, and that person is Lindsay'. They conclude that the semantic contribution of a name such as 'Lindsay' is the same as the semantic contribution of a variable under an assignment, which these opponents suggest is merely the object assigned to that variable. However, renewed interest in variables suggests that they make a more complicated contribution to the semantic processing of sentences that contain them. In particular, a variable contributes both an assignment-unsaturated and an assignment-saturated semantic value. I use this dual role of the semantics of variables to develop a response to the argument from quantifying in. I take as my point of departure Cumming's (2008) view that an attitude ascription relates the subject of an attitude to the assignment-unsaturated semantic value of an open sentence. I argue that this approach fails. I propose an alternative, according to which the truth of a belief ascription depends on both the assignment-saturated and the assignment-unsaturated semantic value of the open sentence in its that-clause. This approach reverses standard assumptions concerning the relation between quantification and substitution.Millianism is the view that names and other singular terms such as indexicals and demonstratives are directly referential, contributing nothing more than their referents as inputs to the semantic processing of sentences that contain them. This entails that sentences differing only by the substitution of co-referential proper names are synonymous. Many take this to be a strike against Millianism, since there are contexts in which the substitution salva veritate of co-referntial proper names looks implausible. The worry is most pressing in the case of attitude ascriptions. For instance, even if 'Lindsay' and 'Nellie' refer to the same individual in the relevant context, it is tempting to suppose that (1) and (2) may differ in truth-value at a time when Michael is ignorant of the fact that Lindsay has two names.(1) Michael believes that Lindsay is charitable.(2) Michael believes that Nellie is charitable.C 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Names, Masks, and Double Vision

“…This proposal also has 'believes' effecting a shift in the assignment function, but it allows us to resolve the Masked Ball problem without having to take the further step of abandoning Millianism and treating names as sensitive to this assignment shift. Finally, I showed that the appeal to conceptual transformers allows the neo-Kaplanian to avoid the triviality problem Pickel (2015) presses against Cumming's attitude semantics.…”

“…By way of conclusion, let me address an objection that Pickel (2015) presses against Cumming's attitude semantics and illustrate how the neo-Kaplanian avoids it. Pickel levels the charge that on Cumming's view, we can infer: from Michael's falsely believing of someone that she is charitable, that he also truly believes of someone that she is charitable.…”

“…I then show that with this alternative semantics in hand, the Millian in fact can, pace Cumming, resolve the Masked Ball problem. By way of conclusion, I then show that the neo-Kaplanian furthermore avoids a trivialization objection that Pickel (2015) presses against Cumming's proposal.…”

“…Moving to Section 6, I show that this neo-Kaplanian semantics allows the Millian to account for the truth conditional difference between the Masked Ball reports (KR) and (RK). I conclude, in Section 7, by showing how the proposal avoids the trivialization objection Pickel (2015) raises against Cumming (2008).…”

Binding bound variables in epistemic contexts

“…I make no claim to novelty in detail-my contributions here involve summary, emphasis, and gestures toward new horizons. Central to my discussion is the idea that certain modals ought to be understood as "assignment-shifting" devices: Various theorists have been toying with assignmentshifting treatments of epistemic contexts such as attitude verbs and epistemic modals (e.g., Cumming 2008, Santorio 2012, Ninan 2012, Pickel 2015, Rieppel 2017). On such views an epistemic " " ends up binding the x in Fx.…”