Variable window power spectral density attack

Hodgers, Philip; Boey, Kean Hong; O’Neill, Máire

doi:10.1109/wifs.2011.6123145

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 11 publications

(15 reference statements)

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“…Another approach is to perform the attack in the frequency domain [12], however discrete Fourier transform (DFT) based approaches operate best when the windowing region can be minimized around the region of interest, as examined in [13]. Phase-only correlation was suggested in [14], where the differences in phase values are used as a realignment vector.…”

Section: B Existing Approaches To Overcome Random Clockingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pre-processing power traces to defeat random clocking countermeasures

Hodgers

Hanley

O’Neill

2015

2015 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS)

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Abstract-We describe a pre-processing correlation attack on an FPGA implementation of AES, protected with a random clocking countermeasure that exhibits complex variations in both the location and amplitude of the power consumption patterns of the AES rounds. It is demonstrated that the merged round patterns can be pre-processed to identify and extract the individual round amplitudes, enabling a successful power analysis attack. We show that the requirement of the random clocking countermeasure to provide a varying execution time between processing rounds can be exploited to select a sub-set of data where sufficient current decay has occurred, further improving the attack. In comparison with the countermeasure's estimated security of 3 million traces from an integration attack, we show that through application of our proposed techniques that the countermeasure can now be broken with as few as 13k traces.

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Section: B Existing Approaches To Overcome Random Clockingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pre-processing power traces to defeat random clocking countermeasures

Hodgers

Hanley

O’Neill

2015

2015 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS)

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“…The theoretical analysis assumed an idealised, noise free, set of source traces, shifted by an arbitrary amount, and it was acknowledged that there would be a phase error introduced by noise in a real-world signal. Another strategy by Hodgers et al [10], exploits the enhanced swing of the power emanations in an EM attack. Here inter-round boundaries of minimal processing power were identified, permitting the individual rounds to be extracted and re-aligned.…”

Section: E Alignment Of Tracesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pre-processing power traces with a phase-sensitive detector

Hodgers

Hanley

O’Neill

2013

2013 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)

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A Sliding Window Phase-Only Correlation Method for Side-Channel Alignment in a Smartphone

Gebotys

White

2015

ACM Trans. Embed. Comput. Syst.

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Future wireless embedded devices will be increasingly powerful, supporting many more applications including one of the most crucial, security. Although many embedded devices offer resistance to bus probing attacks due to their compact size and high levels of integration, susceptibility to attacks on their electromagnetic side channel must be analyzed. This side channel is often quite complex to analyze due to the complexities of the embedded device including operating system, interrupts, and so forth. This article presents a new methodology for analyzing a complex system's vulnerability to the EM side channel. The methodology proposes a sliding window phase-only correlation method for aligning electromagnetic emanations from a complex smartphone running native code utilizing an on-chip cache. Unlike previous research, experimental results demonstrate that data written to on-chip cache within an advanced 312MHz 0.13um processor executing AES can be attacked utilizing this new methodology. Furthermore, for the first time, it has been shown that the point of side-channel attack is not a spike of increased EM but an area of low EM amplitude, unlike what is noted in previous findings. This research is important for advancing side-channel analysis understanding in complex embedded processors and ensuring secure implementations in future embedded ubiquitous devices.

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Variable window power spectral density attack

Cited by 3 publications

References 11 publications

Pre-processing power traces to defeat random clocking countermeasures

Pre-processing power traces to defeat random clocking countermeasures

Pre-processing power traces with a phase-sensitive detector

A Sliding Window Phase-Only Correlation Method for Side-Channel Alignment in a Smartphone

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