Variabilism Is Not the Solution to the Asymmetry

Abstract

According to “the asymmetry”, the fact that a future person would have a life not worth living counts against bringing that person into existence but the fact that a future person would have a life worth living does not count in favour of bringing that person into existence. While this asymmetry seems intuitive, it is also puzzling: if we think that it is of moral importance to prevent people from living lives not worth living, shouldn't we also that it is of moral importance to create people with lives worth living? Melinda Roberts has suggested a view, “Variabilism”, which she argues solves this problem. I argue that Variabilism fails as a solution to the asymmetry. First, Variabilism relies on a particular distinction between gains and losses which is at least as puzzling as the asymmetry itself. Second, in some cases Variabilism is incompatible with the asymmetry. In these cases, the fact that a person would have a life worth living does count in favour of creating her.

The procreative asymmetry and the impossibility of elusive permission

“…For other work on the procreative asymmetry, see e.g Algander (2015),Boonin (2014), Broome (2004,Bykvist (2007a;2007b),Chappell (2017),Elstein (2005),. Frick (forthcoming),Hare (2007;2011), Harman (2004,Heyd (1992),Holtug (2001), McMahan (19811994; …”