Vagueness, truth and logic

Fine, Kit

doi:10.1007/bf00485047

Cited by 1,087 publications

(391 citation statements)

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“…This result has important implications for the philosophical debate concerning the best way to treat vague statements. For example Kamp and Partee's (1995) treatment of vagueness using Fine's Supervaluations (Fine, 1975) requires that the borders of the region of vagueness are themselves less vague. (There is a risk of an infinite regress in which there is a region where the truth of a statement is vague, then there is vagueness about where that region itself begins, then vagueness about where the vagueness of the region begins, and so forth.)…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Rumsfeld effect: The unknown unknown.

Hampton¹,

Aina²,

Andersson³

et al. 2012

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cogni

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This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Abstract A set of studies tested whether people can use awareness of ignorance to provide enhanced test consistency over time if they are allowed to place uncertain items into a "don't know" category. For factual knowledge this did occur, but for a range of other forms of knowledge relating to conceptual knowledge and personal identity, no such effect was seen. Known unknowns would appear to be largely restricted to factual kinds of knowledge. Permanent

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Rumsfeld effect: The unknown unknown.

Hampton¹,

Aina²,

Andersson³

et al. 2012

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cogni

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…²⁹ I owe these examples to Mario Gómez Torrente. ³⁰ Fine (1975) offers the classical supervaluationist account. Alternative accounts of vagueness might well find alternative ways of accounting for the anti-contextualist intuitions I am prepared to grant, but I need to offer a sufficiently specific one and this is the one I take to be correct.…”

Section: Fn:30mentioning

confidence: 99%

Relativism, Vagueness and What is Said

García‐Carpintero¹

2008

Relative Truth

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John MacFarlane has formulated a version of truth-relativism, and has argued for its application in some cases — future contingents, knowledge attributions, and epistemic modals among them. Mark Richard also defends a version of relativism, which he applies to vagueness-inducing features of the semantics of gradable adjectives. On MacFarlane's and Richard's characterization, truth-relativist claims posit a distinctive kind of context-dependence, the dependence of the evaluation of an assertion as true or otherwise on aspects of the context of the evaluation itself — in contrast with the context of the assertion. This chapter follows Evans in distinguishing two forms of truth-relativism: a moderate one concerning the evaluation of contents or propositions, and a radical one concerning the evaluation of acts. It argues against Richard's truth-relativist proposals for gradable adjectives, which are understood to be of the second kind, while accepting a form of moderate content-relativism for those cases.

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“…Some threshold appears only when a fuzzy category is made crisp by forcing individuals into a black-or-white membership decision. However, if this threshold separating membership from non-membership exists, then the excluded middle and contradiction laws will hold for vague concepts, and membership grades only stem from a noisy threshold (Fine, 1975). If this theshold does not exist, then these basic laws of logic will not necessarily hold.…”

Section: World and Wordsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In that sense, fuzzy sets do not have exactly the same concern as other approaches to vagueness. For instance, K. Fine (1975) proposes that statements about a vague predicate be taken to be true if and only if they hold for all possible ways of making the predicate precise. It enables the classical logical relationships between a vague predicate A and its negation not-A to be preserved.…”

Section: Representations Of a Fuzzy Setmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Nevertheless this probabilistic interpretation of the convex combination must be taken with caution. It may mean that an unknown Boolean set is underlying F, whose boundaries are unknown but do exist (Fine, 1975;Williamson, 1994). On the contrary, the Zadehian view is that precise boundaries of F do not exist because this boundary is gradual.…”

Section: Representations Of a Fuzzy Setmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Fuzzy Sets: History and Basic Notions

Dubois¹,

Ostasiewicz

Prade³

2000

The Handbooks of Fuzzy Sets Series

138

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Abstract. This paper is an introduction to fuzzy set theory. It has several purposes. First, it tries to explain the emergence of fuzzy sets from an historical perspective. Looking back to the history of sciences, it seems that fuzzy sets were bound to appear at some point in the 20th century. Indeed, Zadeh's works have cristalized and popularized a concern that has appeared in the first half of the century, mainly in philosophical circles. Another purpose of the paper is to scan the basic definitions in the field, that are required for a proper reading of the rest of the volume, as well as the other volumes of the Handbooks of Fuzzy Sets Series. This Chapter also contains a discussion on operational semantics of the generally too abstract notion of membership function. Lastly, a survey of variants of fuzzy sets and related matters is provided.

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Vagueness, truth and logic

Cited by 1,087 publications

References 5 publications

The Rumsfeld effect: The unknown unknown.

The Rumsfeld effect: The unknown unknown.

Relativism, Vagueness and What is Said

Fuzzy Sets: History and Basic Notions

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