Vagueness in the World: A Supervaluationist Approach

Vague fictional objects

“…32 Now, in such a situation, it seems possible to deduce that there is no single fictional content that philosophers may actually grasp when indeterminate 30 Among famous detractors of ontic vagueness are Russell (1923, p. 85); Dummett (1975, p. 314) [Dummett changes his mind, see Dummett (1981, p. 440)]; Lewis (1986, p. 212). 31 Among philosophers who have offered a defense of ontic indeterminate identity: Broome 1984, van Inwagen 1988, Johnsen 1989, Lowe 1994, Parsons and Woodruff 1995, Parsons 2000, Williams 2008, Barnes 2009, Barnes and Williams 2009, Abasnezhad and Hosseini 2014, Zardini 2014 Among philosophers who have argued against ontic indeterminate identity (besides Evans and Salmon): Cook 1986, Pelletier 1989, Garrett 1991, Williamson 2002, Akiba 2000, Pinillos 2003, Smith 2008, Curtis and Noonan 2014 identity is claimed within fiction: some would not even be able to figure out what a situation in which indeterminate identity occurs would be like; others may claim to understand it but their accounts of it may diverge, so as to make incompatible metaphysical assumptions. 33 And if philosophers do not agree on a single fictional content conveyed by a fictional text claiming ontic indeterminate identity, we may not assume that things might change if non-philosophers, too, were included among the receivers of fiction: there is no possible situation all people would recognize as adequately described by the above description of ontic indeterminate identity; it follows that the alleged fictional description of ontic indeterminate identity does not allow for a single fictional content to be conveyed.…”

Moral realism and semantic accounts of moral vagueness

“…SeeBarnes (2014, 339-62 and 339). Also, seeAbasnezhad and Jenkins (2018) for a recent discussion of Barnes' theory of ontic vagueness andAbasnezhad and Hosseini (2014) for an alternative theory of ontic vagueness.8 SeeFine (1975),Lewis (1986) andKeefe (2000). 9 Here 'P' stands for a vague moral predicate, which has some clear cases of positive/negative application and some borderline cases for which it is indeterminate whether P. We can think that 'P' refers to 'is morally permissible'.…”

Metaphysical Vagueness Without Vague Objects

“…For different defenses of vague objects from Evans's argument see also Sainsbury , Akiba , Parsons , Wilson , and Abasnezhad and Hosseini .…”