V-Dem Codebook v11

Coppedge, Michael; Gerring, John; Knutsen, Carl Henrik; Lindberg, Staffan I.; Teorell, Jan; Altman, David; Bernhard, Michael; Cornell, Agnes; Fish, M. Steven; Gastaldi, Lisa; Gjerløw, Haakon; Glynn, Adam; Hicken, Allen; Lührmann, Anna; Maerz, Seraphine F.; Marquardt, Kyle M.; McMann, Kelly M.; Mechkova, Valeriya; Paxton, Pamela; Pemstein, Daniel; Römer, Johannes von; Seim, Brigitte; Sigman, Rachel; Skaaning, Svend-Erik; Staton, Jeffrey K.; Sundström, Aksel; Tzelgov, Eitan; Uberti, Luca J.; Wang, Yiting; Wig, Tore; Ziblatt, Daniel

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3802627

Cited by 124 publications

(55 citation statements)

References 181 publications

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“…Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem, [Pemstein et al, 2018, Coppedge et al, 2021) is a dataset containing a collection of indicators of latent regime characteristics over 202 countries from 1789 to 2020. The database includes 483 low-level indicators (e.g.…”

Section: V-dem -Cascading Interpretable Classificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Logic Explained Networks

Ciravegna¹,

Barbiero²,

Giannini³

et al. 2021

Preprint

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The large and still increasing popularity of deep learning clashes with a major limit of neural network architectures, that consists in their lack of capability in providing human-understandable motivations of their decisions. In situations in which the machine is expected to support the decision of human experts, providing a comprehensible explanation is a feature of crucial importance. The language used to communicate the explanations must be formal enough to be implementable in a machine and friendly enough to be understandable by a wide audience. In this paper, we propose a general approach to Explainable Artificial Intelligence in the case of neural architectures, showing how a mindful design of the networks leads to a family of interpretable deep learning models called Logic Explained Networks (LENs). LENs only require their inputs to be human-understandable predicates, and they provide explanations in terms of simple First-Order Logic (FOL) formulas involving such predicates. LENs are general enough to cover a large number of scenarios. Amongst them, we consider the case in which LENs are directly used as special classifiers with the capability of being explainable, or when they act as additional networks with the role of creating the conditions for making a black-box classifier explainable by FOL formulas. Despite supervised learning problems are mostly emphasized, we also show that LENs can learn and provide explanations in unsupervised learning settings. Experimental results on several datasets and tasks show that LENs may yield better classifications than established white-box models, such as decision trees and Bayesian rule lists, while providing more compact and meaningful explanations.

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Section: V-dem -Cascading Interpretable Classificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Logic Explained Networks

Ciravegna¹,

Barbiero²,

Giannini³

et al. 2021

Preprint

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“…In each of the models I include a binary variable that is coded as 1 if this is the first election that the Islamist party competed in and 0 otherwise. To measure political liberalization, I rely on the “electoral democracy index” from the Varieties of Democracy (V‐Dem) data set (Coppedge et al, 2021). This index attempts to quantitatively capture Robert Dahl's canonical conceptualization of electoral democracy—or “polyarchy”—that includes competitive elections, freely operating political and civil society groups, extensive suffrage rights, protections for civil liberties, and an independent media (Dahl, 1971).…”

Section: Identifying Islamist Electoral Successmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reevaluating Islamist electoral success and participation in government

Curtis

2022

Digest Mid East Studies

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Under what conditions will Islamist parties perform well in elections and what happens to the political regime should they gain political power? The canonical hypothesis—“one man, one vote, one time”—argues that Islamist parties are likely to perform well whenever elections become free and that their electoral success is likely to lead to a democratic backslide. Others argue that Islamists are not as popular as this hypothesis suggests or that only moderate Islamist parties are likely to perform well and these parties are unlikely to deliberalize a regime. I propose a modification to these hypotheses, and argue that participation in governments, not seat shares, should be conceptualized as electoral success. Furthermore, because they are often the most likely groups to face repression, the presence of Islamists in governments is indicative of a liberalizing process. Using electoral data from across the Muslim‐majority world, I find that Islamists are more likely to hold cabinet‐level positions as regimes become more competitive and that the presence of Islamists in government has a positive effect on future levels of democracy, broadly defined. These findings suggest a need to reevaluate more critical perspectives on the effect of Islamist participation in democratizing countries in the Muslim‐majority world.

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“…We obtained data on exports of goods and services as % of GDP from The World Bank (2021). We accessed the Freedom House data through the V-Dem dataset Coppedge et al (2021). Data on GDP and total export revenue of the GDR as of 1985 is taken from CIA (1987).…”

Section: A7 Alternative Ways To Impute Construction Yearsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do Autocrats Respond to Citizen Demands? Petitions and Housing Construction in the GDR

Hilbig¹,

Lueders²,

Riaz³

2021

Preprint

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Do autocrats strategically respond to citizen demands to ensure regime survival? To answer this question, we assemble a novel panel of housing-related petitions to the government of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in combination with data on housing construction between 1945 -1989. Exploiting the timing of the largest GDR housing program, we employ a difference-in-differences design to show that the housing program was targeted at regions with higher rates of petitioning. We then demonstrate that strategic concerns about regime survival drove responsiveness. We show that the regime was more responsive to petitions from counties with export industries and counties with high collective action potential. Finally, we show that responsiveness lastingly impacts regime support. In the first democratic elections after the demise of the GDR, the authoritarian successor party received more votes in regions targeted by the housing program.

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V-Dem Codebook v11

Cited by 124 publications

References 181 publications

Logic Explained Networks

Logic Explained Networks

Reevaluating Islamist electoral success and participation in government

Do Autocrats Respond to Citizen Demands? Petitions and Housing Construction in the GDR

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