Utpaladeva's Conception of Self in the Context of the Ātmavāda-anātmavāda Debate and in Comparison with Western Theological Idealism

Abstract

This essay examines the unique conception of self (ātman) developed by Utpaladeva, one of the greatest philosophers of the Kashmir Śaiva Recognition (Pratyabhijñā) school, in polemics with Buddhist no-self theorists and rival Hindu schools. The central question that fueled philosophical debate between Hinduism and Buddhism for centuries is whether a continuous stable entity, which is either consciousness itself or serves as the ground of consciousness, is required to sustain all the experienced features of embodied physical and mental activity, and, in the context of the conceptualization of the world as saṃsāra , whether such a self persists between rebirths and in liberation. Utpaladeva argues contra Buddhists and contra other ātmavādins not only that differentiation and unity or change and continuity are compatible, but that a coherent account of our experience requires a continuous dynamic substratum that accommodates both. The Pratyabhijñā's ātman is opposed to that of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣ ika, and Mīmāṃsā insofar as it is de-individuated, which makes it close to Advaita's Brahman, also a universal consciousness, from which it differs, however, insofar as it is theological and acts as the contentbearer by taking on forms, as opposed to being impersonal and passive. When compared with theologies, both from within and outside the wider domain of Hindu thought, the Pratyabhijñā proves to be unique in that it gives a philosophically nuanced account of God, who stands in a nondual relationship to the individual self. This essay also compares the Pratyabhijñā's theological account of self with the theological idealism of Berkeley and Bradley, finding it closer to the latter. Comparing the Pratyabhijñā with its nearest Western philosophical counterparts should make it more accessible and intelligible from the standpoint of the Western academy and pave the way for involving its rich and distinctive conception of self in the fledgling cross-cultural philosophical dialogue on questions concerning self and consciousness.

Reconstructing memories, deconstructing the self

“…Irina Kuznetsova explains:

The Buddhist cannot properly account for the subjective synthesis experienced in memory, namely the certainty that 'I have experienced this in the past' without which a cognitive event by definition cannot be one of remembering, or the oneness of the objective world, which memory reveals insofar as, provided that my remembered cognition was valid, I can rely on for successful practice in the present. (Kuznetsova, , p. 352)

The Buddhist no‐self theorist insists that the subjective certainty experienced in episodic memory in the “feeling of pastness” issues from an error: past cognition cannot enter our current memory experience in any form whatsoever. The Kashmir‐Śaiva philosophers generalise this concern to the doctrine of no‐self itself in claiming that the no‐self view makes it impossible to explain janasthitih (the human condition).…”

“…The Buddhist cannot properly account for the subjective synthesis experienced in memory, namely the certainty that 'I have experienced this in the past' without which a cognitive event by definition cannot be one of remembering, or the oneness of the objective world, which memory reveals insofar as, provided that my remembered cognition was valid, I can rely on for successful practice in the present. (Kuznetsova, , p. 352)…”