‘Utilitarian’ judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas do not reflect impartial concern for the greater good

Kahane, Guy; Everett, Jim A. C.; Earp, Brian D.; Farias, Miguel; Savulescu, Julian

doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2014.10.005

Cited by 270 publications

(342 citation statements)

References 29 publications

(61 reference statements)

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“…Personal dilemmas are associated with egocentric attitudes and no identification with the whole of humanity [12]. "Greater good" dilemmas consider the latter.…”

Section: D5mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the impersonal version, throwing a switch diverts the trolley onto another track, killing one worker. In terms of simple utilitarian arithmetic, this sacrificial dilemma is still utilitarian (but see [12]). After all, one should consider the "greater good" of killing just one man rather than killing five.…”

Section: D5mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Greater good dilemma [12] Benjamin's car or donation. Benjamin is a college student who has always wanted to have his own car.…”

Section: D5mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Greater good dilemma [12] One vs. many donation. Mark is a U.S. businessman who would like to give $1000 to charity, and is deciding between two charities.…”

Section: D4mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Greater good dilemma [12] Firefighter. Albert is a firefighter who is trying to rescue people from a burning building.…”

Section: D3mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Utilitarian Moral Judgments Are Cognitively Too Demanding

Silva¹,

Matsushita²,

Sousa³

2016

OALib

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We evaluate utilitarian judgments under the dual-system approach of the mind. In the study, participants respond to a cognitive reflection test and five (sacrificial and greater good) dilemmas that pit utilitarian and non-utilitarian options against each other. There is judgment reversal across the dilemmas, a result that casts doubt in considering utilitarianism as a stable, ethical standard to evaluate the quality of moral judgments. In all the dilemmas, participants find the utilitarian judgment too demanding in terms of cognitive currency because it requires non-automatic, deliberative thinking. In turn, their moral intuitions related to the automatic mind are frame dependent, and thus can be either utilitarian or non-utilitarian. This suggests that automatic moral judgments are about descriptions, not about substance.

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“…Personal dilemmas are associated with egocentric attitudes and no identification with the whole of humanity [12]. "Greater good" dilemmas consider the latter.…”

Section: D5mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: D5mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Greater good dilemma [12] Benjamin's car or donation. Benjamin is a college student who has always wanted to have his own car.…”

Section: D5mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Greater good dilemma [12] One vs. many donation. Mark is a U.S. businessman who would like to give $1000 to charity, and is deciding between two charities.…”

Section: D4mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Greater good dilemma [12] Firefighter. Albert is a firefighter who is trying to rescue people from a burning building.…”

Section: D3mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Utilitarian Moral Judgments Are Cognitively Too Demanding

Silva¹,

Matsushita²,

Sousa³

2016

OALib

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Age differences in moral judgment: Older adults are more deontological than younger adults

McNair

Okan

Hadjichristidis

et al. 2018

Behavioral Decision Making

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In 2 studies, an older and a younger age group morally evaluated dilemmas contrasting a deontological judgment (do not harm others) against a utilitarian judgment (do what is best for the majority). Previous research suggests that deontological moral judgments are often underpinned by affective reactions and utilitarian moral judgments by deliberative thinking. Separately, research on the psychology of aging has shown that affect plays a more prominent role in the judgments and decision making of older (vs. younger) adults. Yet age remains a largely overlooked factor in moral judgment research. Here, we therefore investigated whether older adults would make more deontological judgments on the basis of experiencing different affective reactions to moral dilemmas as compared with younger adults. Results from 2 experiments indicated that older adults made significantly more deontological moral judgments. Mediation analyses revealed that the relationship between age and making more deontological moral judgments is partly explained by older adults exhibiting significantly more negative affective reactions and having more morally idealistic beliefs as compared with younger adults.

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The influence of decision time on sensitivity for consequences, moral norms, and preferences for inaction: Time, moral judgments, and the CNI model

Kroneisen

Steghaus

2020

Behavioral Decision Making

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It is often discussed that moral judgments are either consistent with the principle of utilitarianism or with the principle of deontology. Utilitarianism is a moral principle stating that the right act is the one that produces the best overall outcome. Deontology represents an ethical position indicating that the morality of an action depends on the intrinsic nature of the action regardless of the consequences. Criticism on the structure of moral dilemmas includes the problem that these dilemmas confound norms and consequences. Recently, a multinomial model (the CNI model) was developed to disentangle and measure sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general preference for inaction versus action (I), respectively. In Experiment 1, we examined the influence of time pressure on moral judgments using the CNI model. We found that time pressure influenced moral dilemma judgments by decreasing participants' sensitivity for consequences. There were no significant effects of time pressure on participants' sensitivity to norms and general preference for inaction. Furthermore, in Experiment 2, we examined the link of reaction times to moral judgments more closely by fitting a hierarchical Bayesian version of the CNI model. Longer reaction times lead to an increase in parameter N, and there was no influence of reaction times on parameter C or I.

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‘Utilitarian’ judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas do not reflect impartial concern for the greater good

Cited by 270 publications

References 29 publications

Utilitarian Moral Judgments Are Cognitively Too Demanding

Utilitarian Moral Judgments Are Cognitively Too Demanding

Age differences in moral judgment: Older adults are more deontological than younger adults

The influence of decision time on sensitivity for consequences, moral norms, and preferences for inaction: Time, moral judgments, and the CNI model

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