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Non-Technical SummaryAn increasing share of productive activities take place in teams. Working in teams allows complementary knowledge and skills to be combined, which can result in outcomes a single person would not achieve. However, since individual contributions to the team output are typically not verifiable, effective teamwork may be impeded by free riders. Free-riding also reduces the effectiveness of team incentives. Thus, if employees' cooperation in teams is important for an organization, it may want hire individuals who are not free riders, but instead are willing to contribute to a common good.What can an organization do in order to find such employees? In job interviews and assessment centers, all applicants can cheaply pretend to be team players. Nevertheless, an applicant's vita may provide substance to such claims. For example, if an applicant voluntarily engages in activities that are primarily done to help needy individuals, this could reveal that she is not only interested in her own benefit, but also cares about the well-being of others. This characteristic may make her more likely to contribute to future teamwork, even if the goal of the teamwork project is unrelated to the cause of the volunteering activity. Thus, social engagement may credibly signal an applicant's willingness to cooperate in teams to potential employers. This is the hypothesis that we test in this paper.We conduct two experiments to detect the signaling value of social engagement and other activities, such as volunteering in students or sports associations. In the first experiment (Study 1), we collect student subjects' current résumés and measure their behavior in a linear public goods game (PGG). In the second experiment (Study 2), we ask human resource managers from different firms and industries to predict the behavior of Study 1 subjects in the PGG, based on their résumés. To identify the impact of extracurricular activities on beliefs, we randomly vary the résumés content. To elicit beliefs in an incentive-compatible manner, the managers' payoff increases in the precision of their predictions. The advantage of this experimental design is that it closely links subjects' behavior and others' beliefs about behavior.Around 20 percent of our 347 subjects in Study 1 present some sort of social engagement on their résumés. It is one of the most commonly mentioned types of extracurricular activities. In order to get an objectiv...