Using player types to understand cooperative behaviour under economic and sociocultural heterogeneity in common-pool resources: Evidence from lab experiments and agent-based models

Klingeren, Fijnanda van

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0268616

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 49 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The game that is used for this paper is a game that better encompasses the underlying mechanism of a renewable resource through implementation of specific contextualised common-characteristics: the CPR game (Kingsley, 2015; Van Soest and Vyrastekova, 2005). The basic functions of the CPR game in the current paper are identical to the CPR game as used in Van Klingeren (2020, 2022).…”

Section: The Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Graduated sanctioning, endogenous institutions and sustainable cooperation in common-pool resources: An experimental test

van Klingeren,

Buskens

2023

Rationality and Society

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

To encourage long-term cooperation in social dilemmas such as common-pool resources, the importance of sanctioning is often stressed. Elinor Ostrom advocates graduated sanctioning: the severity of a defector’s punishment is dependent on the extent of their history of deviant behaviour. In addition, endogenously chosen sanctioning is argued to induce cooperation due to a higher legitimacy. This study compares the effect of graduated and strict mutual sanctioning on cooperation in common-pool resources at the micro and macro level. In addition, we distinguish whether the type of mutual sanction is exogenously determined or endogenously chosen. A Common-Pool Resource game is used in a laboratory experiment, integrating crucial elements of social structure and rule-making mechanisms within a common. Results support the effectiveness of graduated sanctioning compared to strict sanctioning in the long term and partial support using endogenously chosen sanctioning mechanisms versus imposed sanctioning mechanisms.

show abstract

Section: The Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Graduated sanctioning, endogenous institutions and sustainable cooperation in common-pool resources: An experimental test

van Klingeren,

Buskens

2023

Rationality and Society

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Using the institutional grammar to understand collective resource management in a heterogenous cooperative facing external shocks

Bunders,

Moor

2024

Regulation & Governance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Worker cooperatives in the gig economy can involve large and heterogeneous memberships, which makes them vulnerable to member opportunism depleting collective resources. External shocks may present another challenge for collective resource management. This raises the question of how heterogeneous cooperatives design rules to mitigate opportunistic behavior and whether these rules evolve in the face of external shocks. We study the case of Smart Belgium between 2017 and 2022, thereby covering the COVID‐19 pandemic and new cooperative legislation as external shocks. Building on the institutional grammar methodology, we analyze 412 rules of Smart. The findings indicate that external shocks with sudden resource scarcity do not necessarily motivate rule changes (COVID‐19) while external shocks without an effect on collective resources can motivate rule changes (national policy change). The study also shows what kind of rules heterogeneous cooperatives may design to mitigate opportunism.

show abstract

Ecological, financial, social and societal motives for cooperative energy prosumerism: measuring preference heterogeneity in a Belgian energy cooperative

van Klingeren,

De Moor

2024

Energ Sustain Soc

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Background Energy cooperatives in Europe have become more prominent due to the growing interest in and development of renewable energy sources. Cooperatives are often seen as an instrument in the transition to a low-carbon future. The cooperative prosumer is gaining importance, taking on the role of both consumer and producer by setting up and joining electricity cooperatives as investors, shareholders and clients. As is the case with other cooperatives and social enterprises, there are tensions and trade-offs to be made between social, ecological and financial goals. To navigate these tensions and to work towards becoming a resilient institution, it is important that cooperatives preserve their support base made up of their members, who are both clients and shareholders. This study investigates the preference heterogeneity and motivations of members of a large energy cooperative in Belgium, by using stated-choice data from a Discrete Choice Experiment in combination with self-reported membership motives. Results Despite the significant presence of member preferences for participation and democratic voting rights, the financial and above all the ecological motives seem to be most important for being a member of the energy cooperative. Based on the stated-choice data, we classify three member types: the financial, the ecological and the social–societal member type. We find a small discrepancy in motives between members who joined early and members who joined later. Where early members care most about ecological aspects, members who joined later have more societal and financial considerations. In terms of effect size and willingness to pay per kilowatt hour, ecological motives prove to be by far the most important factor for cooperative energy prosumers in our sample. In addition, the latent-class analysis shows that over half of the member sample belongs to the ecological motives class. Conclusions Preference heterogeneity is present to an extent, but there is an overarching preference for sustainability. Though, cooperatives should be aware that their legal form may not be the only factor that drives membership. Rather, keeping high levels of renewable energy, competitive pricing and being an interesting investment opportunity may be key to cooperatives’ resilience and further development on the energy market.

show abstract

Using player types to understand cooperative behaviour under economic and sociocultural heterogeneity in common-pool resources: Evidence from lab experiments and agent-based models

Cited by 3 publications

References 49 publications

Graduated sanctioning, endogenous institutions and sustainable cooperation in common-pool resources: An experimental test

Graduated sanctioning, endogenous institutions and sustainable cooperation in common-pool resources: An experimental test

Using the institutional grammar to understand collective resource management in a heterogenous cooperative facing external shocks

Ecological, financial, social and societal motives for cooperative energy prosumerism: measuring preference heterogeneity in a Belgian energy cooperative

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About