Proceedings of the 2007 Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Streaming and IP-TV - P2p-Tv '07 2007
DOI: 10.1145/1326320.1326322
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Using layered video to provide incentives in P2P live streaming

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Cited by 84 publications
(49 citation statements)
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“…There are three curves which correspond to the simulation, the segment model and stochastic model in [15] respectively. Figure 4b shows the result for an ad-hoc piece selection policy (3,1,6,4,2,5,11,7,12,9,10,8) on a buffer of size n = 14. To apply the segment model, again we split it into two buffers of size 8.…”
Section: Segmentation Approachmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…There are three curves which correspond to the simulation, the segment model and stochastic model in [15] respectively. Figure 4b shows the result for an ad-hoc piece selection policy (3,1,6,4,2,5,11,7,12,9,10,8) on a buffer of size n = 14. To apply the segment model, again we split it into two buffers of size 8.…”
Section: Segmentation Approachmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There are some existing work which discuss various chunk selection policies. In [8], authors notice that chunk scarcity and urgency are two important factors. They consider a class of policies whose chunk priority is decided by a weighting faction that mixes these two factors.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Since C s (u) is convex in u (Proposition 1), and uC p (u) is strictly convex in u, we can observe that the problem (11) is a strictly convex minimization over a compact set, which has a unique solution. According to Lemma 1, any Stackelberg equilibrium (u * , w * ) satisfies that u * is a solution to (11). Therefore, we conclude that the peers' solution in the Stackelberg equilibrium is unique 2 .…”
Section: Theorem 2 the Stackelberg Equilibrium Always Exists If Uc mentioning
confidence: 70%
“…There have been number of research works on incentive issues for P2P systems, e.g., general framework [24], [16], service differentiation models [13], [9], reputation systems [8], [10], multilateral exchange systems [1] and Shapley value approach [14]. While the earlier works [7], [4], [6] are mainly for file sharing systems, recently some research works have been focusing on P2P streaming/VoD systems, e.g., modified tit-for-tat protocol [15], [17], punishment based [12] and reward based [22] mechanisms were proposed. These works incentivized the peers to upload and serve other peers, however, in a large scale distributed system, it is very hard for the peers to be smart enough to know what are the proper data that they should cache.…”
Section: Performance Evaluationmentioning
confidence: 99%