2013
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-37300-8_1
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Using File Relationships in Malware Classification

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Cited by 21 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…In total, we have 23,558 and 5,717 sequences for Cerber and Locky, respectively, with lengths between 2 to 30. We use n-gram analysis by mining the top-k popular bigram and trigram patterns from the sequences [9], [28]. We mine the actual patterns that would be obtained if no privacy were applied, and the patterns obtained after Sequence-CLDP is applied.…”
Section: Case Study #3: Inspecting Suspicious Activitymentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In total, we have 23,558 and 5,717 sequences for Cerber and Locky, respectively, with lengths between 2 to 30. We use n-gram analysis by mining the top-k popular bigram and trigram patterns from the sequences [9], [28]. We mine the actual patterns that would be obtained if no privacy were applied, and the patterns obtained after Sequence-CLDP is applied.…”
Section: Case Study #3: Inspecting Suspicious Activitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It can be argued that this nuanced domain has the potential to greatly benefit from an LDP-like protection mechanism. This is because many security products rely on information collected from their clients, with the required telemetry ranging from file occurrence information in file reputation systems [8], [9], [10] to heterogeneous security event information such as system calls and memory dumps in the context of Endpoint Detection and Response systems (see [11] for a survey on core behavioral detection techniques used by such systems). Nevertheless, clients are often reluctant to share such data fearing that it may reveal the applications they are running, the files they store, or the overall cyber hygiene of their devices.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In static approach, a malicious program is differentiated from benign programs using those features which can be extracted from the program binary, such as bytes read from the file [3], operational codes (opcodes) extracted from disassembled programs [8], [10], etc. Due to the limitations of static approaches against malware obfuscation techniques, which change the appearance of a program's code without changing its action, dynamic approach was proposed [11] which involves executing a given program and observing its behavior with respect to some dynamic aspects such as system calls [5], [12] and ASCII strings present in a process' memory [7], [13], etc. In addition, hybrid approach has also been proposed in the literature, where static and dynamic features are jointly used to represent a program [14], [15].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, such techniques mostly utilize local features either statically or dynamically extracted from file samples, while rarely investigating relations among file samples for malware detection. Recently, features beyond file content are starting to be leveraged for malware detection [149,25,121,72], such as machine-to-file relations [25] and file-to-file relations (e.g., file co-existence) [149,121], which provide invaluable insight about the properties of file samples [149]. In this dissertation, we take a further step to delve deeper into the relationship characteristics of malware and benign files, and investigate how we can construct the file-to-file relation graph between malware and benign file, what graph-based features, relationship characteristics, and representations can be employed for malware detection, and how we can build effective learning frameworks over graph for malware detection.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Ignoring the relations among file samples is a significant limitation of current malware detection methods. Recently, features beyond file content are starting to be leveraged to curb the security threats that malware poses [149,25,121,72], such as machine-to-file relations [25] and file-to-file relations (e.g., file co-existence) [149,121], which provide invaluable insight about the properties of file samples [149]. However, much needs to be done to take full advantage of the relationships of malware and benign files (i.e., malware-malware, malware-benign, benign-benign relations).…”
Section: Acknowledgmentsmentioning
confidence: 99%