2022
DOI: 10.1108/ecam-03-2020-0182
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Using evolutionary game theory to study construction safety supervisory mechanism in China

Abstract: PurposeIn China, external supervision on construction safety mainly comes from the government and supervision engineers (SEs). However, the construction safety supervisory mechanism (CSSM) contains some dilemmas affecting the improvement of safety performance, such as the declining impact of SEs, the increasing rent-seeking behaviors of contractor and excessive government interference. This study aims to depict and analyze the CSSM in China from an evolutionary game view. The objectives are to understand the s… Show more

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Cited by 16 publications
(6 citation statements)
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References 58 publications
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“…The evolutionary game model proposed in literatures 41 , 49 , 51 were utilized to conduct various perspectives of optimization analysis on the implementation pathway of safety performance in the construction industry. There exists a typical 2-player, 2 2 game model, as well as an extended 3-player, 3 3 game model with 8 strategy sets.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The evolutionary game model proposed in literatures 41 , 49 , 51 were utilized to conduct various perspectives of optimization analysis on the implementation pathway of safety performance in the construction industry. There exists a typical 2-player, 2 2 game model, as well as an extended 3-player, 3 3 game model with 8 strategy sets.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Gong et al 40 analyzed the decision-making interaction among stakeholders under both static and dynamic supervisory mechanisms to eliminate information asymmetry between the government and contractors in construction projects and improve the safety performance of construction projects. Jiang et al 41 further analyzed the game relationship of safety regulatory mechanisms on construction sites from the perspective of the involvement of supervising engineers and pointed out that excessive government regulation could have negative impacts.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In fact, continuous characterization of human behavior in games has achieved research results in many other fields [35]- [37]. This paper uses two continuous variables to describe the safety production behavior of coal mining enterprises and the supervision behavior of regulatory authorities, that is, the safety investment of coal mining enterprises and the supervision investment of regulatory authorities.…”
Section: References Supervision Gamementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the research direction of safety management, scholars have analyzed management strategies in key areas such as coal mine safety [37], agricultural safety [38], environmental safety [39], food safety [40], traffic safety [41], and building safety [42] management based on evolutionary game theory. Liu et al built the evolutionary game model of coal mine safety regulation, which is composed of a coal mine regulator and multiple coal mine enterprises.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%